{"id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0550","summary":"Unsigned NSEC or NSEC3 record used in a nonexistence proof (hickory-proto)","details":"Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation kept an NSEC or NSEC3 record for a nonexistence proof if any authority record with the same owner name had validated, not only if that record itself had. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could pair a correctly signed record with a forged NSEC or NSEC3 record of the same owner name and get a forged denial accepted as secure.\n\nFrom 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.","aliases":["CVE-2026-123590","GHSA-57pw-897j-v4j6","RUSTSEC-2026-0557"],"modified":"2026-11-17T10:25:41.214979058Z","published":"2026-09-03T12:00:00Z","database_specific":{"license":"CC0-1.0"},"references":[{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://crates.io/crates/hickory-proto"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0550.html"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/68cb330eb7e73a7db0cec9a25888db9f4bcf2086"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"hickory-proto","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/hickory-proto"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.0.0-0"},{"fixed":"0.26.0-beta.1"}]}],"ecosystem_specific":{"affects":{"os":[],"functions":[],"arch":[]},"affected_functions":null},"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0550.json","cvss":null,"informational":null,"categories":["privilege-escalation"]}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2"}