{"id":"OSEC-2026-12","summary":"AEAD `decrypt_into` functions writes plaintext before checking the tag","details":"On the generic GCM path, `AES.GCM.authenticate_decrypt_into` (as well as `Chacha20.authenticate_decrypt_into` and `AES.CCM16.authenticate_decrypt_into`) writes the decrypted plaintext into the caller's destination buffer and only then compares the tag. On a forged tag the function returns false, but the destination buffer already holds the full plaintext. AEAD decryption is meant to be all-or-nothing: no plaintext should be released until the tag verifies. This is a release of unverified plaintext, and a caller that reads the buffer without first checking the return value sees forged-but-decrypted data. RustCrypto's aes-gcm fixed the same defect in CVE-2023-42811 (rated medium) by re-encrypting the buffer on tag failure.\n\n## Solution\n\nThe tag is validated first, and only if the tag is valid, the decryption into the provided buffer is done. In the CCM code, the tag is computed over the plaintext - if the tag validation fails, the provided buffer is zeroed.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n```OCaml\nmodule GCM = Mirage_crypto.AES.GCM\n\nlet () =\n  let key = GCM.of_secret (String.make 32 '\\x00') in\n  let nonce = String.make 12 '\\x00' in\n  let secret = \"let password = 42\" in\n  let len = String.length secret in\n  let blob = GCM.authenticate_encrypt ~key ~nonce secret in\n  (* flip one bit of the 16-byte tag (at offset len); the ciphertext is untouched *)\n  let forged = Bytes.of_string blob in\n  Bytes.set forged len (Char.chr (Char.code (Bytes.get forged len) lxor 1));\n  let forged = Bytes.unsafe_to_string forged in\n  let dst = Bytes.make len '\\x00' in\n  let verified =\n    GCM.authenticate_decrypt_into ~key ~nonce forged ~src_off:0 ~tag_off:len dst\n      ~dst_off:0 len\n  in\n  Printf.printf \"tag verified: %b (the message is rejected as forged)\\n\" verified;\n  Printf.printf \"secret left in the output buffer: %S\\n\" (Bytes.to_string dst)\n```\n\n## Timeline\n\n- June 25th 2026: report to ocaml/security-advisories\n- June 29th: acknowledgement of issue with several questions for the reporter\n- July 6th: answers from reporter, including a patch\n- July 27th: release of mirage-crypto 2.2.0 and security advisory","modified":"2026-08-07T13:30:06.466504252Z","published":"2026-07-27T19:00:00Z","database_specific":{"human_link":"https://github.com/ocaml/security-advisories/tree/main/advisories/2026/OSEC-2026-12.md","cwe":["CWE-347"],"osv":"https://github.com/ocaml/security-advisories/tree/generated-osv/2026/OSEC-2026-12.json"},"affected":[{"package":{"name":"mirage-crypto","ecosystem":"opam","purl":"pkg:opam/mirage-crypto"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.2.0"}]},{"type":"GIT","repo":"https://github.com/mirage/mirage-crypto.git","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"25e7570aec91e092b347561c23f84b6ec39e7163"}]}],"versions":["0.6.0","0.6.1","0.6.2","0.7.0","0.8.0","0.8.1","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.8.4","0.8.5","0.8.6","0.8.7","0.8.8","0.8.9","0.8.10","0.9.0","0.9.1","0.9.2","0.10.0","0.10.1","0.10.2","0.10.3","0.10.4","0.10.5","0.10.6","0.10.7","0.11.0","0.11.1","0.11.2","0.11.3","1.0.0","1.1.0","1.2.0","2.0.0","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.0.3","2.1.0","v2.1.0","v2.0.3","v2.0.2","v2.0.1","v2.0.0","v1.2.0","v1.1.0","v1.0.1","v1.0.0","v0.11.3","v0.11.2","v0.11.1","v0.11.0","v0.10.7","v0.10.6","v0.10.5","v0.10.4","v0.10.3","v0.10.2","v0.10.1","v0.10.0","v0.9.2","v0.9.1","v0.9.0","v0.8.10","v0.8.9","v0.8.8","v0.8.7","v0.8.6","v0.8.5","v0.8.4","v0.8.3","v0.8.2","v0.8.1","v0.8.0","v0.7.0","v0.6.2","v0.6.1","v0.6.0"],"ecosystem_specific":{"affected_bindings":["Mirage_crypto.AES.CCM16.authenticate_decrypt_into","Mirage_crypto.AES.CCM16.unsafe_authenticate_decrypt_into","Mirage_crypto.Chacha20.authenticate_decrypt_into","Mirage_crypto.Chacha20.unsafe_authenticate_decrypt_into","Mirage_crypto.AES.GCM.authenticate_decrypt_into","Mirage_crypto.AES.GCM.unsafe_authenticate_decrypt_into"],"opam_constraint":"mirage-crypto {\u003c \"2.2.0\"}"},"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/ocaml/security-advisories/blob/generated-osv/2026/OSEC-2026-12.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.8.0","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"}],"credits":[{"name":"Thomas Gazagnaire","type":"REPORTER"},{"name":"Thomas Gazagnaire","type":"REMEDIATION_DEVELOPER"},{"name":"Hannes Mehnert","type":"REMEDIATION_REVIEWER"}]}