{"id":"GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv","summary":"Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken — Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding headers not required in SignedHeaders","details":"### Summary\n\nThe `auth/aws` package of the `chainguard.dev/sdk` Go library provides Chainguard's AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request). Its verifier, `VerifyToken`, reads the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in `SignedHeaders` and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a `GetCallerIdentity` request that a victim signed for a *different* relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers *after* signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with `VerifyToken`. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable — a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay.\n\n### Background\n\nThe package uses the standard \"signed `GetCallerIdentity`\" pattern — the same approach HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method and Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator` use: the caller signs an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves:\n\n- `GenerateToken` (client): builds the `GetCallerIdentity` request, adds the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumable identity, SigV4-signs it, and serializes it into a token.\n- `VerifyToken` (relying party): decodes the token, checks those two binding headers, forwards the request to AWS STS to confirm the caller's real AWS identity (ARN), and returns it so a Chainguard token can be issued for that identity.\n\nThe binding headers exist so a proof minted for one audience/identity cannot be reused for another — a defense against cross-service replay — and their security depends entirely on being covered by the SigV4 signature.\n\n### Impact\n\nA relying party calling `auth/aws.VerifyToken` can be induced to accept a `GetCallerIdentity` proof that a victim produced for an unrelated purpose — for example a request minted for HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method, Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator`, a different audience, or one captured from logs or a proxy — and to treat it as proof of the victim's AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. The signed request is valid within its ~15-minute window. No access to the victim's AWS credentials is required; the attacker only needs a fresh signed `GetCallerIdentity` request from the victim principal.\n\nCode that uses only `auth/aws.GenerateToken` (token generation) is not affected — the generator correctly includes the binding headers in the signature. Only verifiers using `auth/aws.VerifyToken` are affected.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nAll released versions of `chainguard.dev/sdk` that include `auth/aws.VerifyToken`, up to and including `v0.1.106`.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `chainguard.dev/sdk` [v0.1.107](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/releases/tag/v0.1.107). The fix requires both the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers to be present in the request's SigV4 `SignedHeaders` before their values are trusted (mirroring the mitigation HashiCorp Vault applies by requiring `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` to be signed). It additionally adds defense-in-depth checks on the request method, the STS host, and the request timestamp. Upgrade to v0.1.107 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no client-side workaround; the fix is in the verifier. Operators of services that verify AWS-backed identities with `VerifyToken` should upgrade as soon as the patched release is available.\n\n### References\n\n- AWS Signature Version 4 — signed headers: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_sigv.html\n- Comparable mitigation: HashiCorp Vault requires the `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` header to appear in `SignedHeaders` before trusting it.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Kris Kennaway (Datadog).","aliases":["CVE-2026-71861"],"modified":"2026-11-18T21:30:14.739697309Z","published":"2026-11-18T21:16:44Z","database_specific":{"nvd_published_at":"2026-11-18T16:18:16Z","cwe_ids":["CWE-290","CWE-294","CWE-347"],"severity":"HIGH","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T21:16:44Z"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71861"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/commit/d27997d62aaffe85f905cce4cbe8cdebbd5e24eb"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/releases/tag/v0.1.107"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"chainguard.dev/sdk","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/chainguard.dev/sdk"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.1.107"}]}],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"\u003c= 0.1.106","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]}