{"id":"GHSA-vx32-xf7g-9ghr","summary":"qbee-agent: Docker Compose build context Zip Slip writes outside context directory","details":"## Summary\n\n`qbee-agent` contains a Zip Slip vulnerability in `app/utils/tar.go`. The tar extractor checks whether an entry remains inside the destination directory with:\n\n```go\nstrings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean)\n```\n\nThis does not enforce a path separator boundary. If the destination directory is `/tmp/.../context`, a tar entry such as `../context-outside/payload.txt` cleans to `/tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt` and still passes the prefix check. qbee-agent then creates the outside directory and writes the payload outside the intended extraction root.\n\nThe issue is reachable through the Docker Compose build context path when `UseContext` is enabled.\n\n## Details\n\nCode references below were verified against `qbee-io/qbee-agent` commit:\n\n- `1d8bdbb7422adb4ca563d3114cbe2817d6ba3581`\n\nAffected repository:\n\n- `qbee-io/qbee-agent`\n\nAffected files:\n\n- `app/utils/tar.go`\n- Docker Compose context path in `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go`\n\nThe vulnerable extraction code:\n\n- `app/utils/tar.go:89-93`\n\n```go\ntargetPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(destPath, header.Name))\ndestdirClean := filepath.Clean(destPath)\n\nif !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) {\n    return fmt.Errorf(\"tar entry %s is outside of destination directory %s\", targetPath, destdirClean)\n}\n```\n\nThe file is then created at the accepted `targetPath`:\n\n- `app/utils/tar.go:96-109`\n\n```go\ncase tar.TypeDir:\n    if err := os.MkdirAll(targetPath, 0755); err != nil {\n        return err\n    }\ncase tar.TypeReg:\n    targetFile, err := os.Create(targetPath)\n```\n\nDocker Compose build contexts reach this extractor:\n\n- `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go:238-270`\n\nThe context archive is downloaded and then unpacked into the compose project context directory with `utils.UnpackTar`.\n\nArchive source and role evidence:\n\n- `app/configuration/compose.go:14` defines the Docker Compose build context as the remote configuration field `Context string`.\n- `app/configuration/compose.go:26` enables this path with `UseContext`.\n- `app/configuration/file_manager.go:240-246` and `app/configuration/file_manager.go:281-287` show that context sources are resolved either from `file://` local files or from the Qbee file-manager API.\n- Qbee's Docker Compose documentation lists \"Build Context\" as a Docker Compose configuration option: https://docs.qbee.io/configuration-docker-compose.html\n- Qbee's RBAC documentation separates `configuration:manage` from `files:manage`, and maps \"Configure -\u003e Modify configuration\" to `configuration:manage` while \"Files manager -\u003e Write access\" maps to `files:manage`: https://docs.qbee.io/account-users-and-roles.html\n- Qbee's CI/CD documentation describes using a dedicated Qbee user with a role restricted to configuration changes to push and commit deployment configuration: https://docs.qbee.io/tutorial-iot-container-deployment-with-ci-cd-devops.html\n\nTrust-boundary requirement:\n\n- The vulnerable primitive is clear: qbee-agent writes a regular file outside the intended context extraction directory.\n- The security boundary is present when the archive supplier is less privileged than the local qbee-agent process and is not supposed to write arbitrary sibling files in qbee-agent's Docker Compose cache/project area.\n- The public code and documentation support this boundary for tenants that delegate configuration and/or file-manager access to limited users or CI automation.\n- If a deployment allows only full device/fleet administrators to provide Docker Compose context archives, the finding should be treated as hardening for that deployment.\n\n## PoC\n\nTwo failing regression tests add.\n\nThe utility-level test proves the extractor bug directly:\n\n- `app/utils/tar_test.go:132`\n- `Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass`\n\nCommand:\n\n```sh\nwsl -e sh -lc 'cd /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/targets/qbee-agent; /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/.tools/go1.26.4-linux/go/bin/go test ./app/utils -run Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass -count=1 -v'\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\n=== RUN   Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass\n    tar_test.go:169: expected unpackTar to reject sibling-prefix traversal archive\n    tar_test.go:174: path traversal: payload was written outside destPath at /tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt; got \"zip-slip-sibling-prefix\"\n--- FAIL: Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass (0.00s)\nFAIL\n```\n\nThe Docker Compose bundle-path test proves reachability through `Compose.getContext()`:\n\n- `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:13`\n- `Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip`\n\nCommand:\n\n```sh\nwsl -e sh -lc 'cd /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/targets/qbee-agent; /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/.tools/go1.26.4-linux/go/bin/go test ./app/configuration -run Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip -count=1 -v'\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\n=== RUN   Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip\n    bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:66: expected compose context unpack to reject sibling-prefix traversal archive\n    bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:75: compose context path traversal wrote outside context dir at /tmp/.../cache/docker_compose/project-a/context-outside/payload.txt; got \"compose-context-zip-slip\"\n--- FAIL: Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip (0.00s)\nFAIL\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker-controlled Docker Compose build context archive can create directories and regular files outside qbee-agent's intended context extraction directory, with qbee-agent process privileges.\n\nThe demonstrated impact is constrained path traversal:\n\n- It can write sibling-prefix paths such as `cache/docker_compose/\u003cproject\u003e/context-outside/payload.txt`.\n- It does not demonstrate writing arbitrary paths such as `/etc/passwd`; those do not pass the current string-prefix check.\n- It can corrupt or alter files in nearby qbee-agent Docker Compose cache/project paths if their cleaned path shares the destination prefix.\n- It may affect integrity or availability of qbee-agent-managed Docker Compose state, depending on the project/cache layout.\n\nThis report does not claim direct RCE.","aliases":["CVE-2026-129237"],"modified":"2026-11-16T22:45:03.072290977Z","published":"2026-11-16T22:35:40Z","database_specific":{"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-16T22:35:40Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-16T17:17:31Z","cwe_ids":["CWE-22"],"severity":"MODERATE","github_reviewed":true},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/security/advisories/GHSA-vx32-xf7g-9ghr"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129237"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/pull/148"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/commit/eb7875f0a849cb33325956d0b75e27061d7a7fa3"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/releases/tag/2026.41"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"go.qbee.io/agent","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/go.qbee.io/agent"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.0-20260908095235-eb7875f0a849"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-vx32-xf7g-9ghr/GHSA-vx32-xf7g-9ghr.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L"}]}