{"id":"GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f","summary":"sqlite-mcp: Read-only mode bypass via statement chaining and SQL injection in describe_table","details":"### Summary\n\nIn read-only mode (the default), a client that can call the MCP tools can write to the database the server is meant to expose read-only, read other SQLite files, and create new SQLite files anywhere the server process can write. There are two ways in: statement chaining through `execute_query`, and SQL injection through `describe_table`.\n\n### Details\n\n- **Statement chaining in `execute_query`.** The only check was that the query starts with `SELECT`. The `modernc.org/sqlite` driver runs every `;`-separated statement in one call, so anything after `SELECT 1;` ran unchecked.\n- **SQL injection in `describe_table`.** The `table_name` argument was interpolated into `PRAGMA table_info(%s)` with no guard.\n- **Escaping read-only mode.** Through either path, `ATTACH DATABASE` opens a file read-write regardless of the main connection's `mode=ro`. Attaching the protected database itself made it writable. Attaching another path read that file, or created it if it did not exist.\n\nRead-write mode is not affected beyond its intended capabilities, apart from `ATTACH` reaching files other than the configured database.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Modify the database that read-only mode is meant to protect.\n- Read any SQLite database file the server process can read.\n- Create new SQLite-format files anywhere the server process can write, or write to existing SQLite or empty files. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged.\n\nThe server has no built-in authentication and, by default, listens on `:8080` on all interfaces. Unless it is deployed behind an authenticating proxy, anyone who can reach that port can exploit this.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **v0.1.2**:\n\n- `ATTACH` is disabled in the engine (`SQLITE_LIMIT_ATTACHED` set to 0) on every connection that runs a statement.\n- Read-only connections set `query_only`.\n- `execute_query` rejects input that contains more than one statement.\n- `describe_table` passes the table name as a bound parameter.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to v0.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, don't expose the server to untrusted clients: keep it on a loopback or private interface, or run it behind an authenticating proxy such as ToolHive. Mount only the database you intend to expose, read-only at the filesystem or container level.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by @bebold6133.","aliases":["CVE-2026-130008"],"modified":"2026-11-19T22:45:07.119775919Z","published":"2026-11-19T22:25:53Z","database_specific":{"nvd_published_at":"2026-11-18T17:17:38Z","cwe_ids":["CWE-863","CWE-89"],"severity":"HIGH","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-19T22:25:53Z"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-130008"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/pull/112"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/commit/1da5a6582a4f9d90c778db5687ddcd0c39d2c1ec"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/commit/3c244d61cc0a9c0cc5e4d74719c1dc83edcfa339"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp/releases/tag/v0.1.2"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.1.2"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f/GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N"}]}