{"id":"GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj","summary":"Atomic Server: Unauthenticated `/setup` invite grants write access to the entire Drive","details":"## Summary\n\natomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption **ignores the redeemer's identity** (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An **unauthenticated** attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=\u003cattacker_key\u003e` has the server create a new Agent and grant it **write access to the entire Drive**. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8).** No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `server/src/appstate.rs` — creates the `/setup` invite targeting the Drive root with `write=true`, `usagesLeft=1`.\n- `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173` — `construct_invite_redirect` destructures `for_agent: _` (redeemer identity discarded); `?public-key=` → `Agent::new_from_public_key` → `add_rights(agent, target, write=true)`.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nEnvironment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop` in Docker, `http://localhost:9883`, fresh store. No auth headers are used.\n\n1. Confirm the invite is live — `GET /setup` (Accept: `application/ad+json`) shows `invite/write = true`, `invite/target = http://localhost:9883` (Drive root), `usagesLeft = 1`.\n\n2. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:\n\n```http\nGET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:9883\nAccept: application/ad+json\n```\n\nResponse `200 OK` returns a `Redirect` confirming the new agent:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent\":\n      \"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=\",\n  \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA\": [\"https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect\"]\n}\n```\n\n3. `GET /` shows the attacker is now in the Drive's `write` array:\n\n```json\n\"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write\": [\n  \"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...\",                        // legit root\n  \"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=\"  // ATTACKER\n]\n```\n\n4. The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and `POST /commit` (200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.\n\n**Expected:** `/setup` must require operator authentication / a one-time secret.\n**Actual:** Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.)\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem `/setup`.\n- Invalidate `/setup` after first use with an **atomic** `usagesLeft` decrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently.\n- Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in `invite.rs` (`if expires \u003e now { reject }` is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).","aliases":["CVE-2026-69157"],"modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.416403578Z","published":"2026-11-18T20:42:33Z","database_specific":{"severity":"CRITICAL","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T20:42:33Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-17T21:18:12Z","cwe_ids":["CWE-306"]},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69157"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/98517d8921c78bd9b728a2459378c184ebf8a969"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"atomic-server","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/atomic-server"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.29.0"},{"last_affected":"0.40.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"}]}