{"id":"GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5","summary":"Kubeshark: MCP `download_file` writes fetched bytes to an unvalidated destination path","details":"**Ecosystem / package:** Go — `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`\nCLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)\n**Affected component:** `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `download_file`\n**Affected versions:** `\u003e= v53.1.0`, `\u003c v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the\ntool's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)\n**Patched version:** `v53.4.0`\n**Credit:** novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.\n\n## Summary\nThe `download_file` MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied `path` from the Kubeshark\nHub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied `dest` on the local\nfilesystem with no validation of `dest`. An attacker who can influence the MCP\ntool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving\n`kubeshark mcp` — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path\nwritable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`,\n`~/.kube/config`, `~/.bashrc`), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints.\n`download_file` is registered unconditionally (available in the default,\nnon-`--allow-destructive` posture).\n\n## Introduced in\nCommit `eb7dc42b` — \"Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)\",\n2026-03-04 — first released in **v53.1.0** (`v53.1.0~1`). An earlier attempt\n(`dbfd17d9`) was reverted (`a46f05c4`) before any release, so no tag before\nv53.1.0 is affected.\n\n## Details\nIn `callDownloadFile` (`cmd/mcpRunner.go`), both `path` and `dest` come straight\nfrom the tool arguments:\n- `dest` was passed directly to `os.Create(dest)` with no confinement — no\n  `filepath.Clean`, no base-directory containment, no rejection of absolute\n  paths or `../` traversal. Any path the process can write is reachable.\n- `path` was concatenated onto the Hub API base URL with no allowlist, so any\n  Hub endpoint (including captured-traffic exports) is reachable.\n\n## Auth context (CWE-306 / CWE-200)\nThe tool originally issued the fetch with no authentication. The authentication\ngap was addressed by the gated-Hub authentication refactor: the download now\nforwards the operator's Hub credentials (ServiceAccount token / License-Key) and\nrejects auth-required responses instead of writing a login page to disk. **But**\nthe Hub ships auth-disabled by default (community/dev), so on a default\n`kubeshark tap` the Hub API answers without authentication and captured traffic\n(credentials/tokens/PII) can still be read and exfiltrated end-to-end. Enforcing\nHub auth by default is tracked separately (gated-auth workstream) and is **not**\npart of this advisory's fix.\n\n## Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)\nFollowing the tool's documented workflow on a default community install:\n`export_snapshot_pcap` → obtain a relative path → `download_file` with that\n`path` and an attacker-chosen `dest`. The reporter retrieved a captured-traffic\nPCAP and recovered a planted canary `Authorization: Bearer …` credential from\nit, and demonstrated writing the fetched bytes to an arbitrary local path.\n\n## Impact\n- **Integrity (local):** arbitrary file write on the machine running\n  `kubeshark mcp`, as that user.\n- **Confidentiality:** read of Hub API endpoints, incl. captured network traffic\n  (credentials, tokens, PII) on a default (auth-disabled) install.\n- Reliable RCE is not demonstrated (script endpoints are JSON-wrapped).\n\n## Severity rationale\nKubeshark scores this **5.3 Medium**, down from the reporter's 7.1, on two metrics:\n\n- **`AV:N` → `AV:L`.** The vulnerable component has no network listener the\n  attacker reaches. `kubeshark mcp` is a local stdio MCP server; the attacker's\n  input arrives as content an agent running on that host ingests and then\n  replays into a local tool call. The delivery of the poisoned content may cross\n  a network, but the attack surface being exploited is local to the machine.\n- **`I:H` → `I:L`.** The write is confined to paths writable by the user running\n  `kubeshark mcp` (normally unprivileged) — no system-file or other-user\n  modification. The attacker also controls *where* the bytes land, not *what*\n  they are: the body comes from a Hub API response, so the content is\n  constrained to what the Hub will emit. Reliable RCE was not demonstrated.\n- **`A:L` → `A:N`.** Nothing in the issue degrades availability of the CLI, the\n  Hub, or the host; the original `A:L` is unsupported.\n\nKubeshark kept **`C:H`**: on a default community install the Hub API answers\nunauthenticated, so captured traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) is genuinely\nreadable end-to-end. Kubeshark kept **`AC:H`** (the attacker must land an injection in\ncontent the agent ingests and know the deployment layout), **`PR:N`**\n(`download_file` is registered unconditionally — no `--allow-destructive`\nneeded), **`UI:R`** (an operator must be driving an agent against\n`kubeshark mcp`), and **`S:U`** (the impact stays within the local user's\nauthorization scope).\n\n## Patches\nFixed in **v53.4.0** by commit\n[`a76a1920`](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214)\n(PR [#1957](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957)).\n\nChanges in `cmd/mcpRunner.go`:\n- `dest` is resolved through `secureDownloadDest` and confined to a base\n  directory (the CWD by default, relocatable via `KUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR`);\n  a `dest` that resolves outside the base (via `../` or an absolute path) is\n  rejected.\n- `path` is rejected if it contains `..` segments.\n- Containment is re-checked after resolving symlinks, so a symlinked\n  subdirectory inside the base (or a `dest` that is itself a symlink) cannot\n  redirect the write outside it; the file is opened with `O_NOFOLLOW` where the\n  platform provides it.\n- Credential forwarding + auth-required detection on the fetch (shipped in the\n  gated-auth refactor).\n\n## Workarounds\n- Run `kubeshark mcp` as an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory.\n- Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.\n- Enable Hub authentication (`AUTH_ENABLED=true` + an IdP/license) to close the\n  unauthenticated read path.\n\n## Follow-ups (not blocking this advisory)\n- Strict prefix allowlist for the Hub `path` (current fix only rejects `..`).\n- Hub-side default auth enforcement (gated-auth workstream).","aliases":["CVE-2026-129235"],"modified":"2026-11-16T22:30:03.907372699Z","published":"2026-11-16T22:18:58Z","database_specific":{"nvd_published_at":"2026-11-16T17:17:31Z","cwe_ids":["CWE-22","CWE-88"],"severity":"MODERATE","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-16T22:18:58Z"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/security/advisories/GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129235"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/tag/v53.4.0"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.0.2-0.20260304171723-eb7dc42b6ea0"},{"fixed":"0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5/GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N"}]}