{"id":"GHSA-8fh7-7q4q-cq52","summary":"Miren Runtime: Authentication bypass in RPC layer: unverified TLS client certificates grant cluster superuser access","details":"### Summary\n\n  The Miren Runtime RPC server (QUIC/HTTP3, default port `:8443`) requested TLS\n  client certificates but never verified that a presented certificate chained to\n  the cluster Certificate Authority. Because a client-certificate identity is\n  granted a blanket RBAC bypass, any party able to reach the RPC listener could\n  present a forged, self-signed certificate and be authenticated as a cluster\n  **superuser** — no valid CA signature, credential, or prior authorization\n  required.\n\n### Impact\n\n  This is a complete, unauthenticated authentication bypass against the cluster\n  control plane. An attacker who can reach the RPC port can perform any RPC\n  operation with full privileges: enumerate and manipulate entities, apps,\n  sandboxes, disks, and other cluster resources. This yields full compromise of\n  confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the cluster and everything it\n  orchestrates.\n\n  Exposure is network-reachability–gated only. Deployments that expose `:8443`\n  beyond a trusted network (e.g. `0.0.0.0/0`) are remotely exploitable from the\n  internet by anyone; deployments that restrict `:8443` to a trusted network are\n  exploitable by any party with access to that network.\n\nDue to a lack of ability to detect if the RPC has been accessed unauthorized,\nMiren recommends that all applications are redeployed and any credentials reference\nin environment variables are rotated. A read-only script to help review standing access,\nrecent changes, and the exact secrets to rotate is available at https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/tree/089582a132f7fc1e1d5b5c0aee1e0911535fed53/scripts/security/audit-exposure.\n\n\n### Details\n\n  Three independent factors combined to produce the bypass:\n\n  1. **The listener never verified the client-certificate chain.** When a cluster\n     CA was configured, the RPC listener used `tls.RequestClientCert`, which\n     requests a client certificate but does not verify it against the configured\n     `ClientCAs`. `tls.ConnectionState.VerifiedChains` was therefore always empty,\n     and no `VerifyPeerCertificate`/`VerifyConnection` hook re-checked the chain.\n\n  2. **The authenticator derived identity from an unverified certificate.** The\n     RPC authenticators read `PeerCertificates[0].Subject.CommonName` directly as\n     the caller identity, with method `cert`, without checking that the chain had\n     been verified.\n\n  3. **Authorization granted a blanket bypass to certificate identities.** The\n     authorizer returned \"allowed\" for any `cert`-method identity, skipping all\n     RBAC checks.\n\n  Go's TLS client only presents a certificate whose issuer Distinguished Name\n  matches a CA advertised by the server, but that comparison is on the (public,\n  non-secret) DN bytes only — it does not require a valid signature from the CA.\n  An attacker can therefore mint a self-signed certificate whose **issuer DN is\n  byte-identical to the cluster CA subject**, signed with an attacker-controlled\n  key. The stock client presents it, and the vulnerable server accepts it and\n  trusts its CommonName as a superuser identity.\n\n### Patches\n\n  Fixed by verifying the client-certificate chain before trusting it:\n\n  - The listener now uses `tls.VerifyClientCertIfGiven` when a cluster CA is\n    configured. A presented certificate must chain to the configured CA to\n    complete the handshake, while certless callers (JWT/OIDC, which authenticate\n    via the `Authorization` header) are still admitted.\n  - As defense in depth, both RPC authenticators now require a non-empty\n    `VerifiedChains` before deriving an identity from a client certificate.\n\n  Users should upgrade to the patched release and restart the server so the\n  new listener configuration takes effect.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n  Until the patch is deployed, restrict network access to the RPC port (`:8443`)\n  so that it is not reachable from untrusted networks — remove any\n  `0.0.0.0/0` ingress and limit it to trusted management networks. This is a\n  containment measure only and does not remove the underlying vulnerability.","aliases":["CVE-2026-75521"],"modified":"2026-11-19T01:00:05.865271200Z","published":"2026-11-19T00:45:46Z","database_specific":{"nvd_published_at":"2026-11-18T19:18:08Z","cwe_ids":["CWE-295"],"severity":"CRITICAL","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-19T00:45:46Z"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/security/advisories/GHSA-8fh7-7q4q-cq52"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75521"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/commit/e2159c8c8559da3f1c1485b463c794d656cd2fe4"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/mirendev/runtime"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/mirendev/runtime/releases/tag/v0.11.1"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"miren.dev/runtime","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/miren.dev/runtime"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.11.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-8fh7-7q4q-cq52/GHSA-8fh7-7q4q-cq52.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H"}]}