{"id":"GHSA-5x2r-hc65-25f9","summary":"ML-DSA Signature Verification Accepts Signatures with Repeated Hint Indices","details":"**Affected Crate:** `ml-dsa`  \n**Affected Versions:** v0.1.0-rc.2 (and commits since `b01c3b7`)  \n**Severity:** Medium  \n**Reporter:** Oren Yomtov (Fireblocks)\n\n## Summary\n\nThe ML-DSA signature verification implementation in the RustCrypto `ml-dsa` crate incorrectly accepts signatures with repeated (duplicate) hint indices. According to the ML-DSA specification (FIPS 204 / RFC 9881), hint indices within each polynomial must be **strictly increasing**. The current implementation uses a non-strict monotonic check (`\u003c=` instead of `\u003c`), allowing duplicate indices.\n\n**Note:** This is a regression bug. The original implementation was correct, but commit `b01c3b7` (\"Make ML-DSA signature decoding follow the spec (#895)\", fixing issue #894) inadvertently changed the strict `\u003c` comparison to `\u003c=`, introducing the vulnerability.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe vulnerability is located in the `monotonic` helper function in `ml-dsa/src/hint.rs`:\n\n```rust\nfn monotonic(a: &[usize]) -\u003e bool {\n    a.iter().enumerate().all(|(i, x)| i == 0 || a[i - 1] \u003c= *x)\n}\n```\n\nThe comparison operator `\u003c=` allows equal consecutive values, meaning duplicate hint indices are not rejected. The correct implementation should use strict less-than (`\u003c`):\n\n```rust\nfn monotonic(a: &[usize]) -\u003e bool {\n    a.iter().enumerate().all(|(i, x)| i == 0 || a[i - 1] \u003c *x)\n}\n```\n\n### Regression Analysis\n\n- **Original correct code** (commit `1d3a1d1` - \"Add support for ML-DSA (#877)\"): Used `\u003c` (strict)\n- **Bug introduced** (commit `b01c3b7` - \"Make ML-DSA signature decoding follow the spec (#895)\"): Changed to `\u003c=`\n\nThe commit message suggests it was intended to fix issue #894 and make decoding follow the spec, but the change to the `monotonic` function was in the wrong direction. The other changes in that commit (to `use_hint` function) may have been correct, but this specific change introduced signature malleability.\n\n### Technical Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows **signature malleability** - the same logical signature can have multiple valid byte-level encodings. An attacker can take a valid signature and create additional \"valid\" signatures by duplicating hint indices.\n\nPer the ML-DSA specification (FIPS 204, Section 6.2 and Algorithm 26 `HintBitUnpack`), hint indices must be strictly increasing to ensure a unique, canonical encoding. Accepting non-canonical signatures can lead to:\n\n1. **Signature Malleability:** Multiple distinct byte sequences verify as valid for the same message/key pair\n2. **Protocol-Level Vulnerabilities:** Systems that rely on signature uniqueness (e.g., for transaction deduplication, replay protection, or signature-based identifiers) may be vulnerable\n3. **Interoperability Issues:** Non-compliant signatures may be rejected by other conforming implementations\n\n### Affected Security Levels\n\nAll ML-DSA parameter sets are affected:\n- ML-DSA-44 (NIST Security Level 2)\n- ML-DSA-65 (NIST Security Level 3)\n- ML-DSA-87 (NIST Security Level 5)\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nSee the file [`poc_mldsa_repeated_hint.rs`](https://gist.github.com/orenyomtov/fb4616eb77d33017f41a71b30aa41a04) for a standalone proof of concept that demonstrates the vulnerability.\n\nThe PoC uses test vectors from the Wycheproof test suite that specifically test for this invalid encoding:\n\n- **Test Vector Source:** [Wycheproof ML-DSA Test Vectors](https://github.com/C2SP/wycheproof/blob/master/testvectors_v1/mldsa_44_verify_test.json)\n- Test Case ID 18: \"signature with a repeated hint\"\n- Expected Result: `invalid`\n- Actual Result: `valid` (BUG)\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpdate the `monotonic` function in `ml-dsa/src/hint.rs` to use strict less-than comparison:\n\n```rust\nfn monotonic(a: &[usize]) -\u003e bool {\n    a.iter().enumerate().all(|(i, x)| i == 0 || a[i - 1] \u003c *x)\n}\n```\n\n## Design Intent: ML-DSA is NOT Intended to Allow Malleability\n\nWhile some cryptographic libraries intentionally permit signature malleability for compatibility or performance reasons, **ML-DSA is explicitly designed to prevent it**:\n\n1. **FIPS 204 Specification:** ML-DSA is designed to be strongly unforgeable under chosen message attacks (SUF-CMA). This security property explicitly prevents signature malleability.\n\n2. **NIST PQC Forum Discussion:** In February 2024, there was a discussion on the NIST PQC forum about potential malleability in ML-DSA's hint unpacking. The consensus was that ML-DSA is intended to be SUF-CMA, meaning any malleability issues should be considered bugs and fixed.\n\n3. **No Documentation of Intentional Malleability:** There is no documentation in the RustCrypto `ml-dsa` crate, FIPS 204, or RFC 9881 suggesting that signature malleability is an acceptable or intentional property.\n\n4. **Regression Bug:** The fact that the original implementation had strict ordering (`\u003c`) and this was changed to non-strict (`\u003c=`) in a \"fix\" commit suggests this was an unintentional regression, not a design decision.","aliases":["CVE-2026-24850"],"modified":"2026-02-03T03:06:29.257366Z","published":"2026-01-28T16:44:47Z","database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-347"],"severity":"MODERATE","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-01-28T16:44:47Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-01-28T01:16:15Z"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures/security/advisories/GHSA-5x2r-hc65-25f9"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24850"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures/issues/894"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures/pull/895"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures/commit/400961412be2e2ab787942cf30e0a9b66b37a54a"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures/commit/b01c3b73dd08d0094e089aa234f78b6089ec1f38"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9881"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/C2SP/wycheproof"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/C2SP/wycheproof/blob/master/testvectors_v1/mldsa_44_verify_test.json"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/C2SP/wycheproof/blob/master/testvectors_v1/mldsa_65_verify_test.json"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/C2SP/wycheproof/blob/master/testvectors_v1/mldsa_87_verify_test.json"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/RustCrypto/signatures"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"ml-dsa","ecosystem":"crates.io","purl":"pkg:cargo/ml-dsa"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.0.4"},{"fixed":"0.1.0-rc.4"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/01/GHSA-5x2r-hc65-25f9/GHSA-5x2r-hc65-25f9.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.0","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N"}]}