{"id":"DHI-bonk-pg7v-lrkw-v3mf","summary":"## Summary","details":"## Summary\n\nDulwich's `stash.py:pop()` function is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal, allowing an attacker to write arbitrary files outside the repository worktree when a victim pops a stash in a malicious repository.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `pop()` function at `dulwich/stash.py:236` uses `os.path.exists(parent_dir)` to check if a parent directory exists before writing stashed files. `os.path.exists()` follows symlinks, so when an intermediate directory in the path is a symlink pointing outside the worktree (e.g., `link → ../../.git/hooks`), the check passes and subsequent file writes resolve through the symlink.\n\nThe `validate_path()` function (line 228) only validates path component names against `INVALID_DOTNAMES` — it performs zero filesystem symlink detection. On dulwich 1.2.7 (latest release), `build_file_from_blob()` has no symlink protection whatsoever.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can craft a malicious repository that, when a victim clones it and performs a stash pop operation, writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations. Writing to `.git/hooks/post-checkout` achieves Remote Code Execution on the victim's machine on the next git checkout operation.\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. Attacker creates a repository with branch `main` containing `link` (symlink → `../../.git/hooks`) and branch `feature` containing `link/post-checkout` (executable payload)\n2. Victim clones the repository (landing on `main` — symlink `link` exists in worktree)\n3. Victim checks out `feature`, makes changes, runs `stash.push()`\n4. Victim checks out `main` (restoring the `link` symlink)\n5. Victim runs `stash.pop(0)` — stash contains `link/post-checkout`\n6. `os.path.exists(\"link\")` returns True (symlink to existing directory), `os.makedirs` skipped\n7. `build_file_from_blob(blob, mode, \"link/post-checkout\")` → `open(\"link/post-checkout\", \"wb\")` follows the intermediate symlink → payload written to `.git/hooks/post-checkout`\n8. Next checkout operation triggers the hook → RCE\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nBefore writing any file, verify that no component of the target path resolves through a symlink outside the worktree. Use `os.path.realpath(parent_dir)` and confirm it stays within the repository root. Alternatively, use `os.open()` with `O_NOFOLLOW` on each path component.\n\nReported by **zx (Jace)**","modified":"2026-11-21T14:30:15.322634700Z","published":"2026-11-12T23:57:09Z","upstream":["GHSA-cm62-gvxx-vmxx"],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://scout.docker.com/v/DHI-bonk-pg7v-lrkw-v3mf"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cm62-gvxx-vmxx"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-cm62-gvxx-vmxx"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/40a542cb02f9ac39a9eeac1193472903098698f9"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.8"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"netbox","ecosystem":"Docker Hardened Images:Debian:13","purl":"pkg:deb/dhi/netbox"},"versions":["4.6.10-0","4.6.10-1","4.6.7-0","4.6.8-0","4.6.8-1","4.6.8-2","4.6.8-3","4.6.9-0","4.6.9-1","4.6.9-2","4.7.1-0","4.7.1-1","4.7.1-2","4.7.1-3","4.7.1-4","4.7.1-5","4.7.1-6","4.7.2-0","4.7.2-1","4.7.2-2","4.7.2-3","4.7.2-4","4.7.3-0","4.7.3-1","4.7.3-2","4.7.3-3","4.7.3-4","4.7.4-0","4.7.4-1","4.7.4-2","4.7.4-3","4.7.4-4","4.7.4-5","4.7.4-6","4.7.5-0","4.7.5-1","4.7.5-2"],"database_specific":{"owner_kind":"HSP","source":"https://github.com/docker-hardened-images/advisories/blob/main/dhi/osv/2026/DHI-bonk-pg7v-lrkw-v3mf.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.2","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"}]}