{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-67238","details":"RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, rabbit_pid_codec:decompose_from_binary/1 parses a caller-supplied ETF-encoded binary and calls binary_to_atom(Node, utf8) on the node-name field. It is reached from rabbit_volatile_queue:pid_from_name/2, which is invoked for any queue name / routing key beginning amq.rabbitmq.reply-to.. The CandidateNodes membership check happens after the atom is created, and the surrounding try/catch cannot reclaim atoms (they are never GC'd). binary_to_existing_atom is not used. Any authenticated AMQP client can crash the entire Erlang VM (all vhosts, all connections) with ~1M cheap requests. Preconditions include Authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 connection to any vhost No per-connection rate limit low enough to make ~1M operations infeasible. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.","modified":"2026-09-25T08:47:30.967255151Z","published":"2026-09-23T20:17:13.297Z","upstream":["CVE-2026-67238"],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-67238"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"rabbitmq-server","ecosystem":"Debian:14","purl":"pkg:deb/debian/rabbitmq-server?arch=source&distro=forky"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.3.2-1"}]}],"versions":["4.0.5-10","4.0.5-11","4.0.5-12","4.0.5-13","4.0.5-14","4.0.5-6","4.0.5-8","4.0.5-9","4.3.0-1","4.3.0-2","4.3.0-3"],"ecosystem_specific":{"urgency":"not yet assigned"},"database_specific":{"source":"https://storage.googleapis.com/debian-osv/debian-cve-osv/DEBIAN-CVE-2026-67238.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.0","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X"}]}