{"id":"CVE-2026-48088","summary":"OpenReception vulnerable to unauthenticated staff crypto poisoning that breaks E2E recipient directory","details":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.4, the route `POST /api/tenants/{tenantId}/staff/{staffId}/crypto` accepts and stores attacker-controlled ML-KEM-768 public keys against any tenant on the platform without authentication. The handler logs an \"Unauthorized crypto key storage attempt\" warning when neither a session nor a registration cookie is present, then proceeds to insert the row regardless. The platform's E2E claim that \"even administrators cannot view sensitive information\" is broken: any unauthenticated network attacker can register themselves as an additional encryption recipient for any tenant's future patient appointments. A second variant of the bug suppresses the unauthorized-warning log entry. The Zod schema makes the `email` field optional. When the request body omits `email` and the request carries no registration cookie, the comparison `registrationEmail === email` becomes `undefined === undefined`, which evaluates to `true`. The handler treats the request as a legitimate registration flow, skips the warning entirely, and stores the row. Successful storage is still recorded as an `[info]` log line, but the security-relevant warning that operators are most likely to monitor or alert on is gone. The `staff_crypto` table has no unique constraint on `user_id`, so an arbitrary number of attacker rows can coexist for the same staff identifier and all return as `is_active=true`. The supplied `staffId` does not need to match any existing user or pending invite. Schema validation on `passkeyId`, `publicKey`, and `privateKeyShare` is also weak: the literal string `\u003cplaceholder-base64\u003e` was accepted, indicating no length, format, or cryptographic-validity check beyond field presence. This weakness is independent of the auth bypass but compounds it: a poisoned directory can also be filled with malformed entries that break legitimate booking flows. The injected key is consumed by the public booking flow. After completing the unauthenticated `bootstrap-challenge` and `bootstrap-verify` ceremony as a \"patient\", the resulting `bookingAccessToken` is accepted by `GET /api/tenants/{id}/appointments/staff-public-keys`, which returns the attacker-controlled keys alongside any legitimate ones. A new appointment encrypts its tunnel key with ML-KEM to all listed recipients, so the attacker becomes a co-recipient of the encryption and can decapsulate the tunnel key with the matching secret. From there, all appointment payloads for that booking are decryptable. Version 1.0.4 patches the issue.","aliases":["GHSA-pch3-hcmf-cjw4"],"modified":"2026-08-08T03:47:58.109438210Z","published":"2026-08-06T21:34:32.016Z","database_specific":{"cna_assigner":"GitHub_M","cwe_ids":["CWE-862"],"osv_generated_from":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48088.json"},"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48088.json"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-pch3-hcmf-cjw4"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48088"},{"type":"FIX","url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/78dfd9317a0be0897e6e4d73afe670c07a75460f"}],"affected":[{"ranges":[{"type":"GIT","repo":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"78dfd9317a0be0897e6e4d73afe670c07a75460f"}],"database_specific":{"extracted_events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.0.4"}],"source":["AFFECTED_FIELD","REFERENCES"]}}],"versions":["v1.0.2","v1.0.1","v1.0.0","v1.0.0-rc2","v1.0.0-rc"],"database_specific":{"source":"https://storage.googleapis.com/cve-osv-conversion/osv-output/CVE-2026-48088.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.8.0","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L"}]}