{"id":"AZL-96192","summary":"CVE-2026-74556 affecting package kernel 6.6.150.1-1","details":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: libiscsi_tcp: Bound SCSI Response data segment to the connection buffer\n\niscsi_tcp_hdr_dissect() receives the data segment of several PDU types\ninto the fixed-size conn-\u003edata buffer, which is allocated for\nISCSI_DEF_MAX_RECV_SEG_LEN (8192) bytes.  For the LOGIN_RSP, TEXT_RSP,\nREJECT and ASYNC_EVENT opcodes the dissect path already rejects a PDU\nwhose DataSegmentLength exceeds that buffer.\n\nThe SCSI Command Response (ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP) path also copies its\ndata segment (sense/response data) into conn-\u003edata via\niscsi_tcp_data_recv_prep(), but it does so without the same check.  The\nonly upstream bound on in.datalen is conn-\u003emax_recv_dlength, the\ninitiator's advertised MaxRecvDataSegmentLength, which is commonly\nnegotiated well above 8192 (open-iscsi defaults to 262144).  A target\nthat returns a SCSI Response with a DataSegmentLength between 8193 and\nmax_recv_dlength therefore overflows the 8192-byte conn-\u003edata buffer.\n\nOnce the same bound applies, ISCSI_OP_SCSI_CMD_RSP is handled exactly\nlike those responses: bound the data segment, receive it into conn-\u003edata\nwhen present, and otherwise complete the PDU with no data.  Fold the\nopcode into that case group rather than duplicating the check.","modified":"2026-08-31T05:26:27Z","published":"2026-08-15T13:18:01Z","upstream":["CVE-2026-74556"],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74556"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"kernel","ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","purl":"pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"6.6.150.1-1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-96192.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.0"}