{"id":"AZL-93593","summary":"CVE-2026-64322 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.145.2-1","details":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nudf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count\n\nudf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when\n\n\tsizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st-\u003ereallocationTableLen) \u003e sb-\u003es_blocksize\n\nis false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that\nmust fit in the block.  But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte\nsparingEntry elements:\n\n\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c le16_to_cpu(st-\u003ereallocationTableLen); i++) {\n\t\tstruct sparingEntry *entry = &st-\u003emapEntry[i];\n\t\t... entry-\u003eorigLocation ...\n\t}\n\nin udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks().  A\nreallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever\nsizeof(*st) + N \u003c= blocksize, yet the consumers index\nsizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the\nblock.  On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in\nudf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the\nsame length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the\nblock, and its memmove() through st-\u003emapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds\nwrite.\n\nValidate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with\nstruct_size().","modified":"2026-08-28T17:48:12.851188746Z","published":"2026-07-25T10:17:13Z","upstream":["CVE-2026-64322"],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64322"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"kernel","ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","purl":"pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"6.6.145.2-1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-93593.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.0"}