{"id":"AZL-101688","summary":"CVE-2026-89996 affecting package kernel 6.6.150.1-1","details":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndma-buf: dma-heap: don't publish fd before copy_to_user() succeeds\n\nDMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC allocates a dma-buf and installs an fd into the\ncaller's fd table via dma_buf_fd() -\u003e fd_install() before\ndma_heap_ioctl() copies the result back to userspace.  If the trailing\ncopy_to_user() fails, userspace never learns the fd number, but the\nfd (and the underlying dma-buf reference) are already visible to\nother threads in the same process and are leaked for the lifetime of\nthe process.\n\nThe obvious \"close it on the failure path\" fix is unsafe: once\nfd_install() has run, another thread can already dup() the fd, send\nit via SCM_RIGHTS, or close() it and let its number be reused, so a\nsubsequent close_fd() from the ioctl path can operate on an unrelated\nfile.  This was pointed out by Christian König on v1 [1].\n\nRestructure the allocation path so that fd_install() is the last,\nunfailable step of a successful ioctl:\n\n  1. heap-\u003eops-\u003eallocate()      creates the dma_buf.\n  2. get_unused_fd_flags()      reserves an fd number in the caller's\n                                fd table without publishing it, so\n                                no other thread can observe it.\n  3. copy_to_user()             delivers the fd number to userspace;\n                                on failure the fd is returned with\n                                put_unused_fd() and the dma_buf\n                                reference is dropped with\n                                dma_buf_put(), leaving no user-\n                                visible state behind.\n  4. dma_buf_fd_install()       publishes the fd and emits the\n                                trace_dma_buf_fd tracepoint -- from\n                                here on the ioctl cannot fail.\n\nA new dma_buf_fd_install() helper is introduced in dma-buf.c to wrap\nfd_install() together with the DMA_BUF_TRACE() call, preserving the\nexport tracing that dma_buf_fd() provides.  dma_heap_ioctl_allocate()\nis refactored to return the struct dma_buf * directly (returning\nERR_PTR on failure) so the caller holds the dmabuf reference across\nsteps 3 and 4.\n\nThe failure at step 3 is easily reachable from userspace: pass a\nstruct dma_heap_allocation_data that lives in a page whose protection\nis flipped to PROT_READ between copy_from_user() and copy_to_user()\n(e.g. via mprotect()).  Before this change each such ioctl leaks one\ndmabuf fd; after it, the fd table is unchanged on failure and only\n/dev/dma_heap/\u003cname\u003e remains open.\n\nNo UAPI or heap-driver interface change.\n\n[1] https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/175e98de-f414-47d7-81c1-c0fe0a8f7f62@amd.com/","modified":"2026-09-18T05:37:08Z","published":"2026-09-16T11:17:10Z","upstream":["CVE-2026-89996"],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89996"}],"affected":[{"package":{"name":"kernel","ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","purl":"pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"},"ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"6.6.150.1-1"}]}],"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/microsoft/AzureLinuxVulnerabilityData/blob/main/osv/AZL-101688.json"}}],"schema_version":"1.9.0"}